Online Appendix
On The Meaning of Survey Reports of Roll Call "Votes"

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A Study 1: 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Our survey experiment for Study 1 was embedded in 3 team modules fielded on the 2014 CCES. Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed a randomly selected subset of 8 different roll call votes, listed in Table A1. Congress had voted on each in a recent session. We selected these items to follow the set of roll calls survey items from the CCES common content and to vary in both their subject matter and the degree to which voting in the House divided the parties. To assist with summarizing the bill for participants, we sent our bill summaries to six colleagues who are experts in congressional politics. We are grateful to these colleagues for helping us clarify the language of the items.

Respondents were first asked whether or not they supported two of these items, selected at random, using the standard CCES common-content question wording, "Congress considered many important bills over the last few years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle."[1] Each piece of legislation was described using a short bill title followed by a brief description. For example, one item was:

> **US-Korea Free Trade**: Implements the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement. (Emphasis in original)

Respondents could indicate either that they "supported" or "opposed" the bill. Respondents were "soft-forced" to choose one of these options.

One-third of respondents, selected at random, were then asked how they would have voted on four additional items, selected at random from those items not chosen for the control items. The question prompt and response options were the same. However, for each item we added a brief summary of the observed pattern of partisan voting in the House. Thus, the US-Korea Free Trade item shown above would have instead appeared as follows:

> **US-Korea Free Trade**: Implements the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement. 91% of Republicans voted in favor of the bill, and 31% of Democrats voted in favor of the bill. (Emphasis and underlining in original)

Our total sample includes 3,456 respondents. 2,300 individuals were assigned to receive only the two control items, and the additional 1,156 individuals received both the two control measures and four of the party split items. All CCES analysis uses the provided post-stratification weights and is restricted to those respondents who answered all of their assigned roll call items. Of those assigned to two items, 96.1% answered both and 2.4% answered one. Of those assigned to six items, 93% answered all 6, 4.2% answered 5 items, and the remaining 2.9% answered 4 or fewer items. Patterns of non-response do not differ consistently by policy area across the two conditions. Average rates of non-response are 2.6% for the control survey items and 2.2% for the party split survey items.

[1] Note that we did not design this question wording and so it does not line up exactly with our definition of representation. We use the standard wording to help our results speak to existing work using these items.

Table A1: Eight roll call votes used in Study 1

Bill Title	Long Description	Roll Call #	Democrat margin (Y-N%)	Republican margin (Y-N%)
Repeal of Affordable Care Act / Obamacare	Repeals the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and health care-related provisions in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.	460 (July 11, 2012)	3-97	100-0
US-Korea Free Trade	Implements the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement.	783 (October 12, 2011)	31-69	91-9
Simpson-Bowles Budget	Adopt budget proposal endorsed by the Simpson-Bowles Commission.	145 (March 28, 2012)	12-88	7-93
Keystone Pipeline	Extends Federal aid for highways and requires the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to approve the Keystone Pipeline within 30 days.	170 (April 18, 2012)	38-62	94-6
Lowering Gasoline Prices to Fuel an America That Works Act of 2014	Implements a new program to lease space off of America's coasts to drill for new oil and gas resources.	368 (June 26, 2014)	5-95	97-3
Bipartisan Budget Bill of 2013	Implements a budget compromise to reduce some mandatory spending cuts and funds the federal government for fiscal years 2013 and 2014.	640 (December 12, 2013)	84-16	73-27
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013	Provides $1.6 billion toward investigation and prosecution of violent crimes against women and establishes the Office on Violence Against Women within the Department of Justice.	47 (February 28, 2013)	100-0	39-61
End Government Shutdown and Raise Debt Ceiling, 2013	Ends the government shutdown that began October 2013 and increases the federal debt limit.	550 (October 16, 2013)	100-0	38-62

B Study 2: 2016 Survey Sampling International

Study 2 replicates and extends the Study 1 design. All roll call votes selected for Study 2 were cast in the 113th or 114th Senates and are detailed in Table A2. We selected these roll call votes from all final passage votes to vary on topic as well as party splits in the Senate.[2] Additionally, we included a longer (post-treatment) battery on policy importance and confidence to evaluate policy by issue area.

Study 2 was a simple between-subject design. Subjects were assigned at random either to the party split or control condition, and all 12 of their roll call questions were of that type.[3] We fielded the survey through Survey Sampling International (SSI), a firm that maintains an online panel whose demographics approximate a nationally representative sample. Our sample includes 1,464 respondents who participated in May and June of 2016. Although the sample is approximately representative of the American population, we found some demographic and political variables did not match population targets very well, and so constructed post-stratification weights that make the SSI sample approximate the Pew Research Center 2015 Governance Survey, a random-digit dial telephone sample of about 6,000 fielded in September 2015. All analysis uses these weights. We detail the weighting procedure in Section D.

The question wording for the policy importance item was

> Now, for this same list of policy areas, we'd like to know how important it is to you what government does in that area. Compared to all other policy areas (not just the ones listed below), how important is government policy in this area to you?

We exclude from our analysis 347 respondents who failed an attention screener in the middle of the survey because these subjects appear less engaged and are therefore unlikely to provide meaningful responses, yielding a final sample of 1,117 SSI participants. The 12 roll calls were asked in random order across three screens each with four items. After the first screen of four items but before the second, we screened for attention by asking the respondents which of four roll calls they had just given their opinion about. Only one of the four had actually been asked on the first screen, and we use only those respondents who identified this roll call correctly. This sort of screen likely includes some respondent who simply guessed which of the four was the right answer.

C Study 3: 2017-8 Lucid, Inc.

Study 3 replicates and extends the Study 1 and 2 design. Roll call votes selected for Study 3 come from the 113th or 114th House or Senate and are detailed in Table A3. We selected roll call votes with the goal of variation on easy versus hard (salient versus less salient) topics, partisan versus partisan splits, and availability of CBO analysis of the legislation. We identified the roll calls by considering on these dimensions the key votes identified by the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, the American Conservative Union, the Americans for Democratic Action, and the database of the

[2] To assist with summarizing the bill for participants, we sent our bill summaries to six colleagues who are experts in congressional politics. We are grateful to these colleagues for helping us clarify the language of the items.

[3] One advantage of this design over Study 1 is that treatment condition is therefore uncorrelated with response order.

Table A2: Twelve roll call votes used in Study 2

Bill Title	Long Description	Roll Call	Democrat margin (Y-N%)	Republican margin (Y-N%)
Expand Existing Background Checks for Firearm Sales	Require federal background checks for gun sales that take place at gun shows or via the internet, the same requirement that exists for sales from regular brick and mortar gun stores.	97 (April 17, 2013)	91-9	9-91
Set Federal Student Loan Interest Rates	Set federal student loan interest rates, raising rates relative to recent rates but decreasing them compared to the rates that were in force because an old law had expired.	185 (July 24, 2013)	69-31	98-2
Allow a Vote on Funding Transportation and Urban Development	Support a motion to end debate and allow a final vote on a bill that would fund at a level of $54 billion for one year Transportation and Housing and Urban Development.	199 (August 01, 2013)	100-0	2-98
End Government Shutdown and Raise Government Debt Limit	End the government shutdown of October 2013 by funding the government for three months and also allowing it to borrow money.	219 (October 16, 2013)	100-0	60-40
Extend Federal Unemployment Benefits	Extend existing federal unemployment benefits for a minimum of an additional 5 months.	392 (April 07, 2014)	100-0	14-86
Allow a Vote on Changing the Standard for Determining Gender Discrimination in the Workplace	Support a motion to end debate and allow a final vote on a bill that would require employers to show that any wage gaps between men and women with similar jobs and qualifications have a business justification.	553 (September 15, 2014)	100-0	0-100
Approve 2015 Budget and Fund Government for 2015	Agree to a measure that would fund almost all federal government agencies for fiscal year 2015.	645 (December 13, 2014)	60-40	57-43
Approve Keystone XL Pipeline	Allow TransCanada to construct the 1,179-mile Keystone XL pipeline that would carry oil from Canada's tar sands to refineries in Texas.	49 (January 29, 2015)	21-79	100-0
Revise Medicare Physician Payment Rates and Reauthorize Child Health Insurance Program	Change the rules used to calculate physician payments so that doctors who see Medicare patients did not experience large drops in the amount the government paid them for providing care and fund for two years the program that provides free or low-cost insurance for low-income children and families.	144 (April 14, 2015)	100-0	85-15
Pass the FAST Act and Extend the Export-Import Bank	Authorize 6 years of federal spending on highways and other transit programs and extend programs to use federal funds to finance and insure foreign purchases of American goods.	260 (July 30, 2015)	57-43	72-28
Allow a Vote on Banning Federal Funding for Planned Parenthood	Support a motion to end debate and allow a final vote on a bill that would prevent any federal money from going to Planned Parenthood.	262 (August 03, 2015)	5-95	96-4
Repeal ObamaCare	Repeal the Affordable Care Act health care program by removing the federal health insurance requirement, eliminating associated taxes, and eliminating federal subsidies for low-income individuals to purchase insurance. Also bans federal funding of Planned Parenthood for one year.	329 (December 03, 2015)	0-100	96-4

Congressional Budget Office, ultimately choosing the 11 roll calls below. We retained the post-treatment battery on perceptions of policy confidence by issue area from Study 2, though dropped policy importance for reasons of space.

Study 3 was also a between-subject design. Roll calls were separated into two blocks, the five roll calls with a CBO score and the six roll calls without. Subjects were assigned to the same informational intervention in both blocks (control, party split, or chamber split), unless they were assigned to the CBO intervention in the first block, in which case they were assigned at random to one of the other three interventions for the second six roll calls. We fielded the survey through Lucid, a firm that partners with a network of companies that maintain relationships with research participants by engaging them with research opportunities. Lucid technology matches researchers and participants based on the researchers' desired audience, and delivered to us a sample whose demographics approximate a nationally representative sample. Our sample includes 4,524 respondents who participated in December of 2017 and January of 2018. Although the sample is approximately representative of the American population, we found unrepresentativeness on income and education (too low). After dropping 477 respondents who took the survey in less than 8 minutes too quickly to have been paying attention, we constructed post-stratification weights to the American Community Survey raked to margins of 24 categories of household income and 35 categories of age crossed with education. All analysis uses these weights, although they do not change point estimates in any substantive way. We detail the weighting procedure in Appendix Section D.

D Post-Stratification weight construction

All CCES analysis uses the provided post-stratification weights. We constructed post-stratification weights that make the SSI sample approximate the Pew Research Center 2015 Governance Survey, a random-digit dial telephone survey. For the Lucid sample, we constructed post-stratification weights to the 2016-17 American Community Survey raked to margins of 24 categories of household income and 35 categories of age crossed with education.

Study 2: Weighting to Pew Governance Survey

To construct weights to make the SSI sample look like the sample to the Pew Governance Survey, we asked six questions of the SSI sample equivalent to those asked of the Pew sample. We use these six variables (age, gender, state of residence, level of education, 7-point party identification, and 5-point self-reported ideology) with the `rake` function from the `R` library `survey` (R Development Core Team, 2015; Lumley, 2011) to construct post-stratification weights. The Pew survey itself has post-stratification weights to Census targets, which we use to construct the target distribution for our weighting. We trim the resulting weights to range from 1/8 to 8 to limit variance. The case with the largest pre-trimmed weight was a 55-64 year old male from New Jersey with a high school degree who reported being a conservative Republican. The case with the smallest pre-trimmed weight was a 55-64 year old female from Vermont with a postgraduate degree and a very liberal Democrat.

Study 3: Weighting to American Community Survey

To construct weights to make the Lucid sample look like the population totals from the U.S. Census American Community Survey, we use the `rake` function from the `R` library `survey` (R Development Core Team, 2015; Lumley, 2011) to construct post-stratification weights. The ACS provided us national distributions for household income and age crossed with education, which were sim-

Table A3: Eleven roll call votes used in Study 3

Combined title	Chamber	Democrat support (Yea %)	Republican support (Yea%)	CBO?
Require NSA Warrant: Amend the Patriot Act to require the National Security Agency to obtain a warrant in order to gain access to and hold records of domestic phone calls made by Americans.	House	78	81	No
Puerto Rico Debt Restructure: Establish a financial oversight board for Puerto Rico that would have authority to initiate a proceeding for restructuring the islands debts.	Senate	74	67	No
Defund Planned Parenthood: Withhold all federal funding from Planned Parenthood for one year unless it ceases to perform abortions except in the case of rape, incest, or if a mother's life is in danger.	House	1	99	No
Extend Background Checks to Gun Shows: Allow a vote on an amendment to a criminal justice bill that would extend criminal background checks for all gun sales, including sales by gun dealers that they conduct at gun shows.	Senate	93	2	No
Ban Discrimination by Federal Contractors: An amendment to a spending bill that would bar federal contractors from discriminating against employees based on gender or sexual identity.	House	100	18	No
Reverse Rule Requiring Fiduciary Financial Advisors: The Labor Department unveiled a rule in April 2016 requiring broker-dealers to act in the best interests of clients when giving retirement investment advice. This bill would reverse that rule due to concerns the rule would limit consumer choice and increase the cost of financial advice.	Senate	7	100	No
American Small Business Tax Relief Act: The bill makes permanent a variety of tax breaks including a $500,000 allowance for the expensing of depreciable business property and the $2 million threshold after which the amount of such allowance is reduced, and indexes both to increase with inflation.	House	19	100	Yes
Death Tax Repeal Act: Repeals the estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes for estates of decedents dying or for transfers made on or after the enactment date. Revises gift tax rates to lower the top rate to 35% and raises the lifetime exemption for gifts to $5 million, which will be indexed to increase with inflation.	House	4	99	Yes
Reauthorize Agricultural Programs and Cut Food Stamps: Authorizes federal agricultural programs and cuts SNAP (Food Stamp Nutrition Program) program. Also modifies various crop support policies such as direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and average crop revenue election.	House	47	72	Yes
Bonus Depreciation Amendment: Makes permanent a variety of tax provisions, including bonus depreciation for qualified property. Increases by $8,000 the maximum allowable depreciation deduction for a passenger automobile. Makes permanent the election to increase the alternative minimum tax (AMT) credit limitation in lieu of bonus depreciation.	House	18	99	Yes
Revise Medicare Physician Payment Rates and Reauthorize Child Health Insurance Program: Change the rules used to calculate physician payments so that doctors who see Medicare patients did not experience large drops in the amount the government paid them for providing care and fund for two years the program that provides free or low-cost insurance for low-income children and families.	Senate	100	46	Yes

Table A4: CBO votes and text, Study 3

Bill	CBO text
American Small Business Tax Relief Act	The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said about the bill: [E]nacting H.R. 636 would reduce revenues, thus increasing federal deficits, by about $77 billion over the 2015-2025 period.
Death Tax Repeal Act	The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said about the bill: [E]nacting H.R. 1105 would reduce revenues, thus increasing federal deficits, by about $269 billion over the 2015-2025 period.
Reauthorize Agricultural Programs and Cut Food Stamps	The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said about the bill: CBO estimates that direct spending stemming from the programs authorized by the conference agreement would total $956 billion over the 2014-2023 period, of which $756 billion would be for nutrition programs.
Bonus Depreciation Amendment	The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said about the bill: [E]nacting H.R. 4718 would reduce revenues, thus increasing federal budget deficits, by about $287 billion over the 2014-2024 period.
Revise Medicare Physician Payment Rates and Reauthorize Child Health Insurance Program	The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said about the bill: Over the 2015-2025 period, CBO estimates, enacting H.R. 2 would increase both direct spending (by about $145 billion) and revenues (by about $4 billion), resulting in a $141 billion increase in federal budget deficits.

Table A5: Supreme Court votes and text, Study 3

Should the government be allowed to restrict corporations' contributions to political campaigns, despite the First Amendment? Yes means allowing restrictions on political contributions by corporations. Among justices appointed by Democratic presidents, the vote was 3 Yes to 0 No. Among justices appointed by Republican presidents, the vote was 1 Yes to 5 No.
Should the federal government be allowed to involuntarily place sex offenders in mental institutions after their prison sentences have ended? Yes means allowing Congress to pass laws that place sex offenders in mental institutions after they have served their prison sentences. Among justices appointed by Democratic presidents, the vote was 3 Yes to 0 No. Among justices appointed by Republican presidents, the vote was 4 Yes to 2 No.
Should state and local governments be allowed to outlaw the possession of handguns, despite the Second Amendment? Yes means allowing states and localities to restrict handgun ownership. Among justices appointed by Democratic presidents, the vote was 3 Yes to 0 No. Among justices appointed by Republican presidents, the vote was 1 Yes to 5 No.
Should the government be allowed to permit private groups to place religious symbols on government-owned land, despite the First Amendment's language about separation of church and state? Yes means allowing the government to approve private groups placing religious symbols on government-owned land. Among justices appointed by Democratic presidents, the vote was 0 Yes to 3 No. Among justices appointed by Republican presidents, the vote was 5 Yes to 1 No.
Should a city be allowed to try to increase racial diversity by denying the promotion of government employees who passed a promotion test because no black employees passed the test, despite the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Yes means allowing denying promotions to those who passed a test if no black employees passed the test. Among justices appointed by Democratic presidents, the vote was 2 Yes to 0 No. Among justices appointed by Republican presidents, the vote was 2 Yes to 5 No.
Should states be allowed to require voters to provide photo identification at the polling place, despite the fact that it might disenfranchise certain individuals without government issued ID? Yes means allowing states to pass voter ID laws. Among justices appointed by Democratic presidents, the vote was 0 Yes to 2 No. Among justices appointed by Republican presidents, the vote was 6 Yes to 1 No.
Should the government be allowed to use lethal injection to execute convicted criminals on death row, despite the Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment? Yes means allowing the use of lethal injection. Among justices appointed by Democratic presidents, the vote was 1 Yes to 1 No. Among justices appointed by Republican presidents, the vote was 6 Yes to 1 No.
Should the government be allowed to ban a specific abortion procedure, 'partial birth abortion,' without an exception to protect a woman's health? Yes means allowing the banning of partial birth abortions. Among justices appointed by Democratic presidents, the vote was 0 Yes to 2 No. Among justices appointed by Republican presidents, the vote was 5 Yes to 2 No.
Should the President, without Congressional approval, have the right to set up military commissions to try enemy combatants without judicial review, despite the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention? Yes means allowing the president to set up military commissions. Among justices appointed by Democratic presidents, the vote was 0 Yes to 2 No. Among justices appointed by Republican presidents, the vote was 3 Yes to 3 No.

Note: In control condition, final two sentences presenting justice party split was not displayed.

ilarly measured by Lucid. We rake to those targets and trim the resulting weights to range from 1/8 to 8 to limit variance. The case with the largest pre-trimmed weight was a 70-105 year old with less than high school and income less than $14,999. The case with the smallest pre-trimmed weight were two 50-69 year olds with doctoral degrees and income from $55,000 to $59,999.

Results: Survey Supreme Court Opinions Affected by Party Split Information

The logic of using equivalent votes by elites and members of the mass public to understand representation is not limited to studies of the US Congress. Recently, work has also sought to understand the correspondence between judicial behavior, specifically voting by US Supreme Court Judges, and citizen preferences by asking citizens to cast their votes on cases previously considered by the Court (Jessee and Malhotra, 2013; Malhotra and Jessee, 2014).[4] We examine whether expressed opinions by survey respondents on Supreme Court cases are affected by a treatment providing information about the vote split between judges appointed by Republican and Democratic presidents. The opinion of each justice, along with their partisan background is readily available to other members on the court, but may not be available to survey respondents when they consider Supreme Court decisions. Supreme Court cases may be a conservative test because many of these issues are social policy questions where citizens might hold strong opinions and the cases have also been subject to extensive public coverage after the decisions, raising the possibility that our treatment would provide little novel information.[5]

Because judges do not use party labels in their day to day deliberations, we provide information on the partisanship of the president who appointed each justice. In our treatment condition, we present respondents with how judges appointed by each party voted on the case (e.g., 100% of Republican-appointed justices voted for and 0% of Democratic-appointed justices voted for). Figure A1 follows our earlier presentation and compares support for the nine cases we asked about in the control and party split conditions.[6] As with the congressional items, support for each judicial decision varies materially between the two conditions. In 15 of the 18 vote-party observations in the figure (83%), expressed support in the treatment condition moves toward the observed party split for that party's justices. In five of the six cases where the majority vote differed by justice party (i.e., the justices were polarized by party), the party split is greater in the treatment group than control condition.[7] In sum, Figure A1 shows that the measurement challenge we argue affects the comparison of survey reports of roll call votes to congressional votes cast also arises in the comparison of survey responses about court cases to judicial decisions in those cases.

E IRT estimates of representation

One standard approach to evaluating the quality of representation is to use IRT models to summarize the preferences of individuals and representatives across issues and then to compare those

[4] "We ask respondents how they would have voted on a set of cases recently decided by the Court, meaning that we can generate a comparable set of ideal points for both masses and elites in a common space (Jessee and Malhotra, 2013, Abstract)."

[5] Nor do we actually address the salient legal issues at play in these cases, including matters of precedent.

[6] These items were included on Study 3 after the survey roll call measures and were independently randomized at the respondent level. Appendix Table A5 lists the case text and the party splits.

[7] In 18 separate party x bill regressions, reported in Appendix Table A9, the effect of the party vote intervention is statistically significant at $p < .10$ in 8 instances (44%). The average absolute effect is 7 points.

Figure A1: Support for Supreme Court Opinion with and without party split, Study 3



Note: Closed circles (squares) connect support among Democratic (Republican) respondents for opinion from those in control condition (left) to those in the party split condition (right). Open circles (squares) are the actual rate of support among justices appointed by Democratic (Republican) presidents. Absolute value of t-ratio on difference-in-difference estimate of party-times-treatment indicated at x-axis.

summaries (e.g. Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013). The IRT models help mitigate measurement error in each individual item and have been found to be a fair single summary of member votes across thousands of bills (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). In this section, we follow this standard practice while examining how evaluations of representation from IRT models vary when respondents are voting on the bills (from Study 2) with and without additional information.

We implement an IRT voting model using the `R` package `pscl` (Jackman, 2012). We scale the 12 roll call votes cast by each respondent into the same space as the set of senators who voted on those bills. We summarize the implementation below. To place the respondents in the same space as the Senators, we first scaled the Senators by themselves on the 12 roll calls. We then fixed the item parameters estimated from the Senate-only model and applied them to the joint models of Senators and respondents, yielding respondent ideal points in the Senate-space.

Because we use Markov chain Monte Carlo methods for the IRT model, we are able to summarize our posterior beliefs about multiple statistics of polarization. In particular, the United States Senate is a super-majoritarian legislature. We consider how well the distribution of ideal points in the Senate represents the distribution of ideal points in the public, particularly at percentiles of the Senate distribution that correspond to important veto points in the legislature (i.e., the median and the filibuster pivots, Krehbiel, 1998). We consider whether the estimated distribution of citizen preferences (in percentiles) appears more aligned with that in the Senate when citizens are in the party split condition than the control condition.

In Figure A2, we plot the location of quantiles for citizen and Senator distributions of ideal points separately for citizen distributions in the control (top) and party split (bottom) condition.[8] We characterize features of the posterior distribution of these quantiles for each population. Each point is the posterior median ideal point at that quantile, with lines extending to the posterior 95 percent credible interval. We summarize ideal points for the institutionally-relevant 41st, 50th, and 60th percentiles of each distribution, along with the more extreme 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles.

The top frame with respondents in the control condition exhibits the conventional pattern of Senators more polarized than members of the public (e.g., Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015). The ideal point at the 0.1 quantile for citizens has a posterior median of -0.4, while for Senators the 0.1 quantile is one standard deviation more extreme at -1.35. Likewise, the 0.9 Senate quantile is 1.28 compared to 0.29 for citizens. The 0.25 and 0.75 quantiles show similar polarization of legislators relative to their constituents. The slope of ideal point to quantile is notably attenuated for the citizens relative to the Senate, suggesting some breakdown in the representation of preferences.

With respect to the institutional rules of the Senate, invoking cloture requires the votes of 3/5ths of the chamber to proceed to considering most bills. Figure A2 shows that the filibuster generates more status quo bias among the observed set of Senator ideal points than among the set of citizen ideal points in the control condition. Among citizens, the filibuster would have little influence on the set of status quos available to be modified by the legislature. The 0.41, 0.5, and 0.6 quantiles posterior medians are -0.04, 0.01, and 0.06. The Senate filibuster interval, in contrast, ranges from -0.29 to 0.33. Inside this region reside a set of status quo policies that could change in a legislature with the citizens' ideal points but that could not overcome the filibuster with the Senators' ideal points.

[8] Appendix Figure A6 includes all respondents regardless of screener.

Figure A2: Change in representative divergence at selected quantiles with information, Study 2



Note: Points represent the estimated ideal point at quantiles of respondent and Senate posterior distributions (posterior median with 95 percent posterior credible intervals). Figure limited to respondents who passed attention screener. Posterior quantiles of the respondent distribution are closer to quantiles of the Senate distribution when respondents are provided information.

The quantiles of the citizen distribution in the party split condition are less divergent with those in the Senate. The posterior median 0.1 quantile for citizens is -0.92, half a standard deviation closer to the Senate quantile than in the control condition. The posterior median 0.9 quantile in the party split condition is 0.55, a quarter standard deviation closer to the Senate. The 0.25 quantile moves from -0.14 in the control condition to -0.25 party split, and the 0.75 from 0.14 to 0.15.

The filibuster interval for citizens in the party split condition, however, is as narrow as in the control condition. The posterior medians for the 0.41, 0.5, and 0.6 quantiles are -0.1, -0.04, and 0.02. The party split condition thus appears to change the location of the more extreme quantiles of the citizen distribution, but does not have as large an influence on the location of the center of the distribution. The slope in the party split condition is closer to that in the Senate than the slope in the control condition.

In sum, the IRT models suggest that providing a single piece of information leads to a population distribution of ideal points that moves towards the Senate distribution, in particular with fatter tails more consistent with the bimodal distribution in the Senate, suggesting that more information and/or contexts making the survey environment more similar to that facing legislators would lead to policy positions closer to the votes we observe in the national legislature.

E.1 Details of IRT model

We jointly scaled the respondents with the 117 members of the 113th and 114th Senates who voted on some of these 12 roll call votes using the Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) `ideal()` in the `pscl` library in `R` (Jackman, 2012). To place the respondents in the same space as the Senators, we first scaled the Senators by themselves on the 12 roll calls. We then fix the item parameters estimated from the Senate-only model and apply them to the joint models of Senators and respondents.[9] This creates distributions of ideal points in the space implied by the item parameters from a Senate-only model on the assumption that the item parameters are the same for Senators and respondents. Note that the Senators will have mean zero and unit variance in these joint scalings, but not necessarily the respondents.

F Additional tables and figures

One concern with the graphical presentation in Figure **??** is that it sorts individuals only on the basis of their partisanship. In fact, some partisans may be "cross-pressured" because their ideological views are inconsistent with their partisan orientation. For this reason, in Appendix Figure A3 we replicate our analysis separately for partisans whose ideology is aligned with their party orientation (i.e., Democrats who are liberal or moderate and Republicans who are conservative or moderate) and those whose ideology is at odds with their party orientation. For the aligned partisans, their behavior closely follows those shown in the pooled Figure **??** analysis. For cross-pressured partisans, the picture is more complicated. There are too few cross-pressured Republicans in our sample for reliable analysis, but for cross-pressured Democrats, they are both generally more conservative and move toward the Republican position on two issues when informed of the House vote. These two bills, on the Keystone Pipeline and the bill described as lower gas taxes, are two notable cases

[9] The item parameters were fixed by setting the prior mean to the posterior mean from the Senate-only model, the prior variance to 100e-3, and no normalization to the distribution of ideal points. All models were burned in for 150,000 iterations, and then 200,000 samples were taken, thinned by 20 yielding 10,000 posterior values summarizing each parameter. Convergence was evaluated by Geweke statistics, where in each case about 95 percent of Gewekes were inside [-1.96, 1.96].

in which the Republican leadership pushed bills that presented policy options targeting unpopular Democratic policies.

Figure A7 plots, for each policy area, the relationship between self-assessed confidence (the vertical axis) and policy importance (horizontal axis). Each black line is a loess smooth of the individual relationship for that policy area. We indicate the average importance score (vertical grey lines) and average confidence score (horizontal grey lines) for each policy area. We also present the tabulation of each response at each value on the two axes, for example only 6% of responses to the question about policy importance indicated the policy was "not at all important." Several important patterns emerge.

First, on average, respondents think most policy areas are important. The average importance score across all policy areas is 2.14, which is slightly more than somewhat important. Only 21% of evaluations scored the policies as little or not at all important. Second, while respondents think policy in these areas is important, they are on average less confident in their ability to pick policies that give them what they want. The average confidence score is 1.56, which is roughly half way between a little and somewhat competent. While 41% of evaluations indicated the policy area "one of the most important," only 22% of evaluations indicated the individual felt "very confident" that they could distinguish good from bad policies. Further, the loess smooths show that there is only a weak positive relationship between believing a policy area is important and believing one can identify good public policy. Thus, it is not the case that simply thinking something is important means individuals have great confidence that they can pick which policies are best in that area.

Tables A6, A7, and A8 present regression estimates for treatment effects in the three studies.

Figure A3: Support for roll call with and without party split information by party-ideology cross-pressure



Note: Closed circles (squares) connect support among Democratic (Republican) respondents for bill from those in control condition (left) to those in the party split condition (right). Open circles (squares) are the actual rate of support among Democratic (Republican) members of the House. The top frame presents support for non-cross-pressured partisans, liberal and moderate Democrats and moderate and conservative Republicans. The bottom frame presents cross-pressured conservative Democrats; there are too few liberal Republicans to plot.

Figure A4: Support for roll call with and without party split information, Study 2, All respondents



Note: Closed circles (squares) connect support among Democratic (Republican) respondents for bill from those in control condition (left) to those in the party split condition (right). Open circles (squares) are the actual rate of support among Democratic (Republican) members of the Senate. These rates were presented to respondents in the party split condition. Absolute value of t-ratio on difference-in-difference estimate of party-times-treatment indicated at x-axis.

Figure A5: Votes with Democratic side in Senate by condition and party, Study 2, All respondents



Note: Each line is the distribution across number of votes with the Democrats on the 12 roll call votes in Study 2. Limited to respondents and senators who voted on all 12 roll call votes and to respondents who passed the screener.

Figure A6: Change in relative polarization with information, Study 2, All respondents



Note: Points represent the estimated ideal point at quantiles of respondent and Senate posterior distributions (posterior median with 95 percent posterior credible intervals). Posterior quantiles of the respondent distribution are closer to quantiles of the Senate distribution when respondents are provided information.

Figure A7: Relationship of confidence to importance by policy area, Study 2



Note: Each line is a loess smooth of respondents' assessment of their own confidence that they are able to evaluate policy in an area to the importance they ascribe to policy in that area. The policy areas correspond roughly to the 12 roll call votes of Study 2. Vertical and horizontal lines indicate the mean confidence and importance for each policy. Percentage of responses in each category across roll calls indicated on each axis.

Table A6: Roll call vote treatment effects, Study 1

VARIABLES	(1) All Bipartisan Budget Bill of 2013	(2) Dems	(3) Reps	(4) All End Government Shutdown and Raise Debt Ceiling 2013	(5) Dems	(6) Reps	(7) All Keystone Pipeline	(8) Dems	(9) Reps	(10) All Lowering Gasoline Prices to Fuel an America That Works Act of 2014	(11) Dems	(12) Reps
Party split condition	0.0084	0.026	0.019	0.052*	0.085*	-0.068	-0.035	-0.12**	0.13**	-0.043	-0.061	0.0028
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Democrat	0.15**			0.25**			-0.17**			-0.26**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Republican	0.071*			-0.23**			0.27**			0.15**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Constant	0.62**	0.76**	0.69**	0.50**	0.74**	0.30**	0.60**	0.46**	0.79**	0.77**	0.52**	0.90**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	1,391	637	478	1,447	665	514	1,464	685	511	1,403	635	512
R-squared	0.018	0.001	0.000	0.193	0.010	0.005	0.160	0.014	0.033	0.160	0.004	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

VARIABLES	(1) All Repeal of Affordable Care Act/Obamacare	(2) Dems	(3) Reps	(4) All Simpson-Bowles Budget	(5) Dems	(6) Reps	(7) All US-Korea Free Trade	(8) Dems	(9) Reps	(10) All Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013	(11) Dems	(12) Reps
Party split condition	-0.031	-0.048	0.058	0.0032	0.14**	-0.19**	-0.036	-0.20**	0.12**	-0.049*	0.042	-0.14**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Democrat	-0.33**			0.097**			0.017			0.18**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Republican	0.25**			0.037			0.16**			-0.11**		
	(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.03)		
Constant	0.63**	0.31**	0.84**	0.36**	0.40**	0.48**	0.56**	0.64**	0.65**	0.74**	0.88**	0.66**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	1,463	694	505	1,363	635	453	1,353	627	472	1,393	644	492
R-squared	0.266	0.003	0.007	0.007	0.019	0.035	0.021	0.038	0.017	0.094	0.005	0.020

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A7: Roll call vote treatment effects, Study 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
VARIABLES	All Budget 2015	Dems	Reps	All Defund Planned Parenthood	Dems	Reps	All End Shutdown Raise Debt Limit	Dems	Reps	All Extend Unemployment	Dems	Reps
Party split condition	0.066*	0.12**	0.027	-0.016	-0.058	0.15**	0.042	0.097*	-0.027	0.016	0.083*	-0.20**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Democrat	0.18**			-0.24**			0.31**			0.28**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Republican	-0.050			0.24**			-0.089*			-0.17**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.03)		
Constant	0.59**	0.74**	0.56**	0.47**	0.25**	0.64**	0.44**	0.72**	0.38**	0.55**	0.78**	0.47**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,117	370	461	1,117	370	461	1,117	370	461	1,117	370	461
R-squared	0.042	0.023	0.001	0.123	0.005	0.028	0.099	0.013	0.001	0.110	0.012	0.042

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
VARIABLES	All Firearm Background Checks	Dems	Reps	All Gender Discrimination	Dems	Reps	All Highway Funding Ex-Im Bank	Dems	Reps	All Keystone Pipeline	Dems	Reps
Party split condition	-0.038	-0.018	-0.19**	-0.074**	0.047	-0.20**	-0.048	-0.19**	0.13**	-0.087**	-0.24**	0.031
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Democrat	0.12**			0.19**			0.015			-0.15**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Republican	-0.15**			-0.20**			0.041			0.19**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.04)		
Constant	0.83**	0.94**	0.75**	0.70**	0.83**	0.56**	0.66**	0.75**	0.62**	0.61**	0.55**	0.74**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Observations	1,117	370	461	1,117	370	461	1,117	370	461	1,117	370	461
R-squared	0.063	0.001	0.038	0.092	0.004	0.042	0.004	0.040	0.020	0.069	0.061	0.001

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
VARIABLES	All Medicare Pay and SCHIP	Dems	Reps	All Repeal Obamacare	Dems	Reps	All Student Loan Interest Rates	Dems	Reps	All Transport Urban Devel Fund	Dems	Reps
Party split condition	0.055*	0.035	0.14**	-0.054*	-0.083	0.035	-0.033	-0.11*	0.11**	-0.038	0.017	-0.17**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Democrat	0.11**			-0.33**			-0.0099			0.29**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Republican	-0.027			0.33**			0.098**			-0.14**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Constant	0.76**	0.88**	0.69**	0.59**	0.27**	0.87**	0.67**	0.71**	0.70**	0.56**	0.82**	0.48**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,117	370	461	1,117	370	461	1,117	370	461	1,117	370	461
R-squared	0.026	0.003	0.025	0.228	0.010	0.003	0.010	0.014	0.017	0.104	0.001	0.029

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure A8: Relationship of actual party splits to respondent beliefs, Study 3



Note: Each frame plots the relationship between actual party split in Congress (x-axis) and Lucid respondent beliefs about the party split (y-axis). The three points above each location on the x-axis correspond to the guess on the party split by Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, respectively. The figure shows respondents were not well informed about the splits on these bills, on average – points fall far from the dashed 45 degree line.

Table A8: Roll call vote treatment effects, Study 3

VARIABLES	(1) All Bonus Depreciation	(2) Dems	(3) Reps	(4) All Death Tax Repeal	(5) Dems	(6) Reps	(7) All Medicare Pay and SCHIP	(8) Dems	(9) Reps	(10) All Reauthorize Agriculture and Cut Food Stamps	(11) Dems	(12) Reps	(13) All Small Business Tax Relief	(14) Dems	(15) Reps
Chamber split condition	0.061**	0.0026	0.18**	0.071**	0.13**	0.023	0.041*	0.077**	0.039	-0.0053	0.0016	-0.016	0.034	0.062*	-0.0042
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
CBO condition	-0.12**	-0.21**	-0.034	-0.017	0.021	-0.072*	-0.11**	-0.12**	-0.100**	0.036	0.027	0.012	-0.072**	-0.088**	0.0020
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party split condition	-0.020	-0.27**	0.28**	0.013	-0.13**	0.11**	-0.0015	0.14**	-0.19**	0.055**	0.038	0.11**	-0.090**	-0.27**	0.061*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Democrat	-0.033			-0.070**			0.097**			-0.076**			-0.053**		
	(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)		
Republican	0.18**			0.29**			0.083**			0.31**			0.20**		
	(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)		
Constant	0.46**	0.50**	0.54**	0.47**	0.40**	0.75**	0.67**	0.74**	0.79**	0.31**	0.24**	0.62**	0.62**	0.60**	0.78**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	4,502	1,994	1,606	4,507	1,997	1,607	4,502	1,998	1,605	4,503	1,996	1,608	4,508	1,996	1,609
R-squared	0.055	0.057	0.063	0.112	0.027	0.018	0.019	0.040	0.037	0.136	0.001	0.009	0.066	0.051	0.004

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

VARIABLES	(1) All Ban Gender Identity Discrimination	(2) Dems	(3) Reps	(4) All Defund Planned Parenthood	(5) Dems	(6) Reps	(7) All Firearm Background Checks	(8) Dems	(9) Reps	(10) All Puerto Rico Debt Restructure	(11) Dems	(12) Reps	(13) All Require NSA Warrant	(14) Dems	(15) Reps	(16) All Reverse Fiduciary Rule	(17) Dems	(18) Reps
Chamber split condition	-0.021	-0.0091	-0.045	0.043**	0.000046	0.11**	-0.088**	-0.083**	-0.11**	0.038*	0.053*	0.051	0.084**	0.097**	0.093**	0.046**	0.061*	0.015
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Party split condition	-0.083**	0.030	-0.24**	0.0046	-0.061**	0.046	-0.096**	0.0014	-0.26**	0.024	0.094**	-0.025	0.10**	0.091**	0.17**	0.022	-0.16**	0.21**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Democrat	0.14**			-0.16**			0.13**			0.18**			0.11**			-0.051*		
	(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)		
Republican	-0.033			0.33**			-0.017			0.073**			0.12**			0.18**		
	(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)		
Constant	0.77**	0.88**	0.79**	0.35**	0.22**	0.65**	0.78**	0.89**	0.82**	0.58**	0.74**	0.66**	0.61**	0.72**	0.71**	0.38**	0.37**	0.52**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	4,511	2,003	1,608	4,508	2,000	1,610	4,510	2,003	1,610	4,510	2,002	1,608	4,511	2,004	1,609	4,513	2,003	1,610
R-squared	0.047	0.002	0.048	0.206	0.004	0.009	0.044	0.013	0.056	0.026	0.009	0.004	0.022	0.012	0.030	0.048	0.029	0.035

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A9: Supreme Court vote treatment effects, Study 3

VARIABLES	(1) All Allow Ban Partial Birth Abortion	(2) All Allow Commitment of Sex Offenders	(3) All Allow Lethal Injection	(4) All Allow Local Handgun Bans	(5) All Allow Military Tribunals	(6) All Allow Photo ID Requirement	(7) All Municipal Employee Diversity	(8) All Private Religious Symbols Public Land	(9) All Restrict Corporate Political Contributions
Party split condition	0.017	0.11**	-0.011	-0.037	-0.020	-0.062**	0.077**	-0.0066	-0.036
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Democrat	-0.19**	-0.013	-0.075*	0.24**	-0.043	-0.080**	0.029	-0.058	0.12**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Republican	0.12**	0.027	0.13**	-0.13**	0.28**	0.22**	-0.097**	0.27**	-0.013
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.43**	0.56**	0.68**	0.37**	0.21**	0.65**	0.18**	0.28**	0.58**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,823	1,807	1,864	1,796	1,842	1,864	1,832	1,798	1,802
R-squared	0.086	0.014	0.042	0.121	0.114	0.089	0.029	0.104	0.019

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Democrats

VARIABLES	(1) Dems	(2) Dems	(3) Dems	(4) Dems	(5) Dems	(6) Dems	(7) Dems	(8) Dems	(9) Dems
Party split condition	-0.028	0.16**	0.015	0.068*	-0.037	-0.051	0.19**	-0.019	0.059
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.27**	0.52**	0.60**	0.55**	0.17**	0.56**	0.16**	0.23**	0.65**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	826	823	857	828	821	843	841	816	820
R-squared	0.001	0.027	0.000	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.045	0.001	0.004

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Republicans

VARIABLES	(1) Reps	(2) Reps	(3) Reps	(4) Reps	(5) Reps	(6) Reps	(7) Reps	(8) Reps	(9) Reps
Party split condition	0.12**	0.095*	-0.050	-0.15**	0.025	-0.060*	-0.013	0.0069	-0.15**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.50**	0.60**	0.84**	0.30**	0.46**	0.87**	0.14**	0.55**	0.62**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	636	654	666	634	677	651	634	630	646
R-squared	0.015	0.010	0.004	0.032	0.001	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.022

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

G Unweighted tables and figures

In Appendix Table A10 we present balance tests for treatment assignment by whether or not we use the stratification weights. For Study 1, Study 2, and the Supreme Court cases of Study 3, there is one treatment and one control condition. We run a logit model predicting treatment assignment as a function of covariates. Using the Stata `svy` command for weighted logit estimation, we test for imbalance with a joint F-test on the covariates. In each case, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on covariates are zero. For the two blocks of roll calls in Study 3 with four conditions, we run a multinomial logit via Stata `svy`. Again, the F-tests in each case do not reject the null hypothesis of balance across conditions, with or without stratification weights.

Appendix Figures A9 to A15 and Tables A11 to A15 present results from main text and appendix without use of post-stratification weights.

Table A10: Balance tables with and without weights

Study 1

VARIABLES	(1) Unweighted	(2) se	(3) Weighted	(4) se
Party split condition		(.)		(.)
Age category	-0.039	(0.03)	0.0045	(0.05)
male	0.057	(0.11)	-0.056	(0.18)
What is the highest level of education you have completed?	0.0018	(0.03)	0.026	(0.06)
region==Northeast	-0.37*	(0.17)	-0.26	(0.27)
region==South	-0.15	(0.15)	-0.20	(0.23)
region==West	-0.10	(0.16)	-0.0038	(0.25)
Total family income last year	0.0015	(0.04)	-0.0071	(0.06)
Are you currently married, living with a partner, divorced, separated, widowed,	0.0081	(0.03)	0.077	(0.05)
Has donated to political candidate last two years	-0.17	(0.13)	-0.19	(0.21)
Definitely or not sure if registered to vote	0.38	(0.20)	0.39	(0.31)
Constant	-0.017	(0.32)	-0.52	(0.48)
Observations	1,454		1,454	
F-test	1.105		0.723	
F p-value	0.354		0.703	

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Study 2

VARIABLES	(1) Unweighted	(2) se	(3) Weighted	(4) se
Party split condition		(.)		(.)
Age in years	0.013	(0.01)	0.017	(0.01)
Female (1=yes)	0.11*	(0.05)	0.045	(0.06)
Age squared / 100	-0.014	(0.01)	-0.018	(0.01)
Race=Black (1=yes)	-0.079	(0.08)	0.0031	(0.11)
Race=Hispanic (1=yes)	-0.11	(0.10)	-0.18	(0.17)
Race=Other (1=yes)	-0.016	(0.10)	0.0044	(0.13)
Church attendance scale (0=Never, 4=¿1 per week	0.033	(0.02)	0.034	(0.02)
Income scale (1-12, DK=6)	-0.00031	(0.01)	0.011	(0.01)
Income refused/dk	-0.098	(0.08)	0.10	(0.11)
Constant	-2.29**	(0.22)	-2.43**	(0.30)
Observations	37,163		37,163	
F-test	1.390		0.917	
F p-value	0.187		0.509	

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Study 3

VARIABLES	(1) Block 1 Unweighted	(2) Block 1 Unweighted	(3) Block 1 Unweighted	(4) Block 1 Unweighted	(5) Block 1 Weighted	(6) Block 1 Weighted	(7) Block 1 Weighted	(8) Block 1 Weighted	(9) Block 2 Unweighted	(10) Block 2 Unweighted	(11) Block 2 Unweighted	(12) Block 2 Weighted	(13) Block 2 Weighted	(14) Block 2 Weighted	(15) SCOTUS Unweighted	(16) SCOTUS Weighted
Education (1=HS or less, 8=PhD+	0.014	-0.025		-0.0064	0.013	-0.052		0.061	0.0056		0.014	-0.013		0.066	-0.019	-0.0034
	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Race=Black (1=yes, 0=no)	0.23	-0.046		0.095	0.19	0.20		-0.015	0.19		0.025	0.20		0.0093	-0.055	-0.33*
	(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.23)		(0.20)	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.18)		(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.16)
Race=Other (1=yes, 0=no [White or Black])	-0.0083	-0.21		-0.099	-0.050	-0.28		-0.19	0.015		-0.055	-0.014		-0.15	-0.058	-0.13
	(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.21)		(0.19)	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.17)		(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Income (Scale, 1-24, refused=25)	0.00037	-0.0025		-0.0016	-0.0040	0.0087		-0.0027	0.0032		-0.0034	0.0014		-0.0023	0.0051	0.0076
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income Refused (1=yes)	-0.0012	0.21		0.030	0.064	0.13		-0.30	-0.015		0.037	0.059		-0.29	-0.068	-0.16
	(0.22)	(0.21)		(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.33)		(0.32)	(0.19)		(0.20)	(0.30)		(0.29)	(0.16)	(0.25)
Hispanic (1=yes)	-0.23	0.15		-0.30	-0.19	0.34		-0.096	-0.31*		-0.23	-0.32		-0.057	0.24*	0.20
	(0.15)	(0.14)		(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.22)		(0.25)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.21)		(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Region=Northeast	0.040	0.056		0.093	0.12	0.23		0.23	0.065		0.029	0.12		0.16	0.061	0.0071
	(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.20)		(0.20)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Region=South	0.078	0.12		0.079	0.12	0.20		0.14	0.12		0.096	0.090		0.093	0.0081	-0.014
	(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.17)		(0.17)	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Region=West	0.038	0.014		0.0032	-0.030	0.16		-0.061	0.065		0.0023	0.088		0.019	0.040	0.15
	(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.20)		(0.20)	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.17)		(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Registered to Vote (1=Yes for sure)	-0.0066	0.16		0.065	-0.050	0.11		-0.16	-0.024		0.034	-0.046		-0.14	0.038	0.12
	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.14)		(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Age in years	-0.0036	-0.0027		0.00066	0.00095	-0.000029		0.0026	-0.0033		0.00033	0.0024		0.0025	0.0017	-0.00090
	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-0.63**	-0.62**		-0.76**	-0.72**	-0.90**		-0.98**	-0.52**		-0.68**	-0.61**		-0.89**	-0.11	-0.034
	(0.17)	(0.18)		(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.26)		(0.24)	(0.16)		(0.15)	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Observations	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487	4,487
F-test	0.896	0.896	0.896	0.896	0.999	0.999	0.999	0.999	0.815	0.815	0.815	0.821	0.821	0.821	0.760	1.018
F p-value	0.638	0.638	0.638	0.638	0.470	0.470	0.470	0.470	0.710	0.710	0.710	0.702	0.702	0.702	0.680	0.427

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure A9: Support for roll call with and without party split information, Study 1 Unweighted



Note: Closed circles (squares) connect support among Democratic (Republican) respondents for bill from those in control condition (left) to those in the party split condition (right). Open circles (squares) are the actual rate of support among Democratic (Republican) members of the House. Absolute value of t-ratio on difference-in-difference estimate of party-times-treatment indicated at x-axis.

Figure A10: Support for roll call with and without party split information, Study 2 Unweighted



Note: Closed circles (squares) connect support among Democratic (Republican) respondents for bill from those in control condition (left) to those in the party split condition (right). Open circles (squares) are the actual rate of support among Democratic (Republican) members of the Senate. Absolute value of t-ratio on difference-in-difference estimate of party-times-treatment indicated at x-axis.

Figure A11: Votes with Democratic position in Senate by condition and party, Study 2 Unweighted



Note: Each line is the distribution across number of votes with the Democrats on the 12 roll call votes in Study 2.

Figure A12: Support for roll call with and without party split information, Study 3 Unweighted



Note: Closed circles (squares) connect support among Democratic (Republican) respondents for bill from those in control condition (left) to those in the party split condition (right). Open circles (squares) are the actual rate of support among Democratic (Republican) members in the chamber. Absolute value of t-ratio on difference-in-difference estimate of party-times-treatment indicated at x-axis.

Figure A13: Support for roll call from control to Chamber Split condition, Study 3 Unweighted



Note: Closed circles (squares) connect support among Democratic (Republican) respondents for bill from those in control condition (left) to those in the chamber split condition (right). Diamonds are the actual rate of support in the chamber. P-value for an F-test on the treatment and treatment times party regression coefficients to evaluate significance of treatment indicated at x-axis

Figure A14: Support for roll call from control to CBO condition, Study 3 Unweighted



Note: Closed circles (squares) connect support among Democratic (Republican) respondents for bill from those in control condition (left) to those in the CBO condition (right). CBO condition presents respondents with a synopsis of the Congressional Budget Office analysis of the legislation. Number in parenthesis is the deficit impact calculated by the CBO. There was no deficit impact presented in the analysis to the Agricultural authorization. P-value for an F-test on the treatment and treatment times party regression coefficients to evaluate significance of treatment indicated at x-axis

Figure A15: Relationship of actual party splits to respondent beliefs, Study 3 Unweighted



Note: Each frame plots the relationship between actual party split in Congress (x-axis) and Lucid respondent beliefs about the party split (y-axis). The three points above each location on the x-axis correspond to the guess on the party split by Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, respectively. The figure shows respondents were not well informed about the splits on these bills, on average – points fall far from the dashed 45 degree line.

Table A11: Policy confidence attenuates treatment effect of information, Study 2 Unweighted

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Dems	(3) Reps	(4) All	(5) Dems	(6) Reps
Average confidence in control condition by party	-0.027	-0.062	0.11	0.013	-0.073	0.076
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.24)
Average importance in control condition by party				-0.065	0.014	-0.13
				(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Republican respondent	0.022			0.014		
	(0.03)			(0.03)		
Constant	0.14	0.19	-0.030	0.23	0.18	0.29
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.38)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.40)
Observations	22	11	11	22	11	11
R-squared	0.032	0.056	0.018	0.111	0.061	0.247

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Note: OLS coefficients. Dependent variable is absolute value of treatment effect of providing party split on roll call support by party and bill.

Table A12: Roll call vote treatment effects, Study 1 Unweighted

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
VARIABLES	All Bipartisan Budget Bill of 2013	Dems	Reps	All End Government Shutdown and Raise Debt Ceiling 2013	Dems	Reps	All Keystone Pipeline	Dems	Reps	All Lowering Gasoline Prices to Fuel an America That Works Act of 2014	Dems	Reps
Party split condition	0.0055	0.014	0.038	0.027	0.056	-0.048	-0.044	-0.10**	0.081*	-0.034	-0.059	0.0088
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Democrat	0.17**			0.32**			-0.14**			-0.25**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Republican	0.029			-0.18**			0.29**			0.14**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Constant	0.64**	0.81**	0.66**	0.45**	0.75**	0.30**	0.58**	0.46**	0.83**	0.77**	0.53**	0.89**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	1,391	637	478	1,447	665	514	1,464	685	511	1,403	635	512
R-squared	0.030	0.000	0.002	0.205	0.004	0.003	0.162	0.011	0.013	0.147	0.003	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
VARIABLES	All Repeal of Affordable Care Act/Obamacare	Dems	Reps	All Simpson-Bowles Budget	Dems	Reps	All US-Korea Free Trade	Dems	Reps	All Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013	Dems	Reps
Party split condition	-0.010	-0.0081	0.043	-0.023	0.10**	-0.18**	-0.068*	-0.20**	0.075	-0.043	0.0096	-0.11*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Democrat	-0.32**			0.065			0.039			0.15**		
	(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.03)		
Republican	0.30**			0.0072			0.18**			-0.19**		
	(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.03)		
Constant	0.58**	0.26**	0.86**	0.39**	0.40**	0.46**	0.54**	0.64**	0.67**	0.77**	0.90**	0.61**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	1,463	694	505	1,363	635	453	1,353	627	472	1,393	644	492
R-squared	0.309	0.000	0.004	0.004	0.010	0.035	0.028	0.040	0.006	0.126	0.000	0.012

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A13: Roll call vote treatment effects, Study 2 Unweighted

VARIABLES	(1) All Budget 2015	(2) Dems	(3) Reps	(4) All Defund Planned Parenthood	(5) Dems	(6) Reps	(7) All End Shutdown Raise Debt Limit	(8) Dems	(9) Reps	(10) All Extend Unemployment	(11) Dems	(12) Reps
Party split condition	0.066**	0.13**	0.020	0.0037	-0.0053	0.092*	0.091**	0.18**	0.047	-0.031	0.084*	-0.13**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Democrat	0.086**			-0.11**			0.25**			0.19**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Republican	-0.096**			0.29**			-0.093**			-0.19**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Constant	0.62**	0.67**	0.54**	0.41**	0.31**	0.65**	0.41**	0.62**	0.34**	0.59**	0.72**	0.45**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,462	522	586	1,464	523	587	1,464	523	587	1,464	523	587
R-squared	0.033	0.020	0.000	0.125	0.000	0.010	0.103	0.041	0.002	0.110	0.010	0.019

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

VARIABLES	(1) All Firearm Background Checks	(2) Dems	(3) Reps	(4) All Gender Discrimination	(5) Dems	(6) Reps	(7) All Highway Funding Ex-Im Bank	(8) Dems	(9) Reps	(10) All Keystone Pipeline	(11) Dems	(12) Reps
Party split condition	-0.067**	0.052	-0.18**	-0.078**	0.13**	-0.24**	0.015	-0.11**	0.15**	-0.043	-0.17**	0.10**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Democrat	0.058			0.13**			-0.0066			-0.097**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Republican	-0.14**			-0.21**			0.013			0.24**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Constant	0.80**	0.80**	0.72**	0.73**	0.75**	0.60**	0.63**	0.68**	0.57**	0.56**	0.53**	0.73**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	1,464	523	587	1,464	523	587	1,463	522	587	1,464	523	587
R-squared	0.044	0.005	0.036	0.102	0.026	0.057	0.001	0.013	0.024	0.099	0.029	0.016

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

VARIABLES	(1) All Medicare Pay and SCHIP	(2) Dems	(3) Reps	(4) All Repeal Obamacare	(5) Dems	(6) Reps	(7) All Student Loan Interest Rates	(8) Dems	(9) Reps	(10) All Transport Urban Devel Fund	(11) Dems	(12) Reps
Party split condition	0.077**	0.088**	0.069	-0.0015	-0.019	0.050	0.029	-0.061	0.13**	-0.069**	0.056	-0.19**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Democrat	0.071*			-0.26**			-0.020			0.18**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Republican	-0.061*			0.29**			0.072*			-0.22**		
	(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)		
Constant	0.74**	0.81**	0.69**	0.55**	0.29**	0.81**	0.62**	0.65**	0.64**	0.64**	0.76**	0.48**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,464	523	587	1,464	523	587	1,463	523	586	1,464	523	587
R-squared	0.029	0.016	0.006	0.233	0.000	0.005	0.009	0.004	0.021	0.128	0.005	0.040

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A14: Roll call vote treatment effects, Study 3 Unweighted

VARIABLES	(1) All Bonus Depreciation	(2) Dems	(3) Reps	(4) All Death Tax Repeal	(5) Dems	(6) Reps	(7) All Medicare Pay and SCHIP	(8) Dems	(9) Reps	(10) All Reauthorize Agriculture and Cut Food Stamps	(11) Dems	(12) Reps	(13) All Small Business Tax Relief	(14) Dems	(15) Reps
Chamber split condition	0.038	-0.0038	0.10**	0.018	0.025	0.010	0.013	0.0076	0.034	0.035	0.033	0.034	0.033	0.027	0.027
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
CBO condition	-0.11**	-0.16**	-0.056	-0.055**	-0.045	-0.076*	-0.15**	-0.18**	-0.13**	0.032	0.023	0.020	-0.053**	-0.061*	-0.0098
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party split condition	-0.015	-0.23**	0.25**	-0.018	-0.17**	0.099**	-0.019	0.098**	-0.17**	0.049**	0.029	0.093**	-0.095**	-0.28**	0.083**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Democrat	-0.052**			-0.12**			0.069**			-0.098**			-0.047*		
	(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)		
Republican	0.18**			0.24**			0.065**			0.25**			0.18**		
	(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)		
Constant	0.46**	0.47**	0.57**	0.51**	0.42**	0.73**	0.72**	0.77**	0.80**	0.31**	0.22**	0.56**	0.63**	0.62**	0.77**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	4,502	1,994	1,606	4,507	1,997	1,607	4,502	1,998	1,605	4,503	1,996	1,608	4,508	1,996	1,609
R-squared	0.054	0.039	0.049	0.107	0.021	0.016	0.024	0.045	0.034	0.108	0.001	0.005	0.057	0.049	0.007

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

VARIABLES	(1) All Ban Gender Identity Discrimination	(2) Dems	(3) Reps	(4) All Defund Planned Parenthood	(5) Dems	(6) Reps	(7) All Firearm Background Checks	(8) Dems	(9) Reps	(10) All Puerto Rico Debt Restructure	(11) Dems	(12) Reps	(13) All Require NSA Warrant	(14) Dems	(15) Reps	(16) All Reverse Fiduciary Rule	(17) Dems	(18) Reps
Chamber split condition	-0.017	-0.037*	-0.0039	0.0047	-0.014	0.043	-0.060**	-0.060**	-0.079**	0.029	0.032	0.040	0.075**	0.072**	0.085**	0.062**	0.045	0.075*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Party split condition	-0.070**	0.017	-0.19**	0.016	-0.033	0.063*	-0.075**	-0.0054	-0.18**	0.032	0.080**	-0.0017	0.071**	0.066**	0.12**	0.015	-0.15**	0.19**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Democrat	0.13**			-0.16**			0.12**			0.19**			0.072**			-0.075**		
	(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)		
Republican	-0.047**			0.33**			-0.054**			0.056**			0.088**			0.17**		
	(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)		
Constant	0.77**	0.88**	0.76**	0.36**	0.22**	0.67**	0.79**	0.89**	0.77**	0.58**	0.75**	0.64**	0.65**	0.73**	0.73**	0.39**	0.36**	0.50**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	4,511	2,003	1,608	4,508	2,000	1,610	4,510	2,003	1,610	4,510	2,002	1,608	4,511	2,004	1,609	4,513	2,003	1,610
R-squared	0.044	0.004	0.034	0.201	0.001	0.004	0.043	0.006	0.026	0.029	0.006	0.001	0.013	0.007	0.017	0.049	0.025	0.024

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A15: Supreme Court vote treatment effects, Study 3 Unweighted

VARIABLES	(1) All Allow Ban Partial Birth Abortion	(2) All Allow Commitment of Sex Offenders	(3) All Allow Lethal Injection	(4) All Allow Local Handgun Bans	(5) All Allow Military Tribunals	(6) All Allow Photo ID Requirement	(7) All Municipal Employee Diversity	(8) All Private Religious Symbols Public Land	(9) All Restrict Corporate Political Contributions
Party split condition	-0.0062	0.081**	0.0047	-0.0091	-0.042*	-0.035	0.077**	0.016	-0.026
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Democrat	-0.15**	-0.021	-0.075**	0.19**	-0.047	-0.12**	0.083**	-0.066*	0.11**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Republican	0.17**	0.041	0.13**	-0.12**	0.29**	0.24**	-0.0095	0.25**	-0.023
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.42**	0.53**	0.67**	0.34**	0.22**	0.64**	0.14**	0.29**	0.60**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,823	1,807	1,864	1,796	1,842	1,864	1,832	1,798	1,802
R-squared	0.086	0.010	0.041	0.083	0.122	0.117	0.022	0.089	0.019

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Democrats

VARIABLES	(1) Dems	(2) Dems	(3) Dems	(4) Dems	(5) Dems	(6) Dems	(7) Dems	(8) Dems	(9) Dems
Party split condition	-0.043	0.11**	0.032	0.063	-0.059*	-0.020	0.15**	-0.0064	0.024
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.28**	0.49**	0.58**	0.50**	0.18**	0.51**	0.18**	0.23**	0.68**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	826	823	857	828	821	843	841	816	820
R-squared	0.002	0.011	0.001	0.004	0.007	0.000	0.030	0.000	0.001

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Republicans

VARIABLES	(1) Reps	(2) Reps	(3) Reps	(4) Reps	(5) Reps	(6) Reps	(7) Reps	(8) Reps	(9) Reps
Party split condition	0.069	0.080*	-0.019	-0.10**	-0.023	-0.037	0.018	0.076	-0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.55**	0.57**	0.81**	0.27**	0.49**	0.88**	0.16**	0.51**	0.61**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	636	654	666	634	677	651	634	630	646
R-squared	0.005	0.007	0.001	0.016	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.006	0.012

Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

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