Representativeness and Motivations of Contemporary Contributors to Political Campaigns: Results from Merged Survey and Administrative Records[1]

Seth J. Hill
Assistant Professor
University of California, San Diego
Department of Political Science
9500 Gilman Drive #0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
sjhill@ucsd.edu

Gregory A. Huber
Professor
Yale University
Department of Political Science
Institution for Social and Policy Studies
77 Prospect Street, PO Box 208209
New Haven, CT 06520-8209
gregory.huber@yale.edu

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ABSTRACT

Because money, unlike votes, is not distributed equally, it is essential to understand how well the views of those who contribute are representative of the larger electorate. We present analysis from a novel dataset that combines administrative records of two types of political participation, donating and voting, with a rich set of survey variables. Examining differences in demographics, validated voting, and ideology, we find that in both parties donors are consistently and notably divergent from non-donors to a larger degree than voters are divergent from non-voters. Of great interest, in both parties donors are more ideologically extreme than other partisans. We also use these data to examine why individuals contribute. We show that donors appear responsive to their perception of the stakes in the election. Overall, our results suggest that donations are a way for citizens motivated by the importance of elections to increase their participation beyond solely turning out.

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Money is a central factor in American elections, from affecting who chooses to run for office (Fowler and McClure 1990) to influencing which candidates ultimately prevail (Jacobson 1978; Huber and Arceneaux 2007). Moreover, individual donors are an important source of campaign funds, and contributing to campaigns and political organizations is an important form of participation. Because money, unlike votes, is not distributed equally among those eligible to vote, it is essential to understand how well the views of those who contribute to campaigns are representative of the larger electorate, particularly given fears that those with greater resources to engage in political activity have greater influence on the political process (Schattschneider 1960, Bartels 2008, Gilens 2012).

Despite the centrality of donors in the American political system, we know relatively little about the contemporary representativeness of those who donate (the "donorate") compared to the larger American electorate. While some scholars have used self-reported contributions to compare the behavior of donors to others (e.g., Grant and Rudolph 2002; Panagopoulos and Bergen 2006), this research approach may be misleading if individuals misreport their contribution or voting behavior. It is for this reason that others have surveyed donors identified using administrative records (e.g., Brown et al. 1980; 1995), but this important seminal work is now somewhat dated and may not reflect the contemporary legal, economic, or political context (for an exception, see Barber 2014a, 2014b).[2]

In this paper, we present analysis from a novel dataset that combines administrative records of two types of political participation, donating and voting, with a rich set of survey variables. These data allow us to measure actual contribution behavior, rather than the self-reported behavior that may be subject to various biases. We merged the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), which includes validated measures of turnout and registration, with selected variables from the individual-level records of campaign contributions reported in the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME, Bonica 2013). The DIME dataset has several novel features, including a person-level record for individuals who donated to multiple campaigns, broad coverage of different ways in which individuals donate money (it includes donations to local, state, and federal elections made to candidates, PACs, super PACs, leadership PACs, 527s, party committees, campaigns for state ballot measures, and other recipient committees that engage in fundraising activities), and an estimated contributor ideology score (the *CFscore*, See Bonica 2013, 2014).

These data allow us to undertake a systematic analysis of how those who make political donations are different from the broader American electorate. In particular, because we have access to a rich battery of behavioral and attitudinal outcomes measured using the same survey instrument for both donors and non-donors, we can assess whether those who donate are ideologically representative of the potential electorate (registered voters), those who vote in general or primary elections, and even members of their party. Additionally, we can also examine whether these patterns hold when comparing donors to non-donors among those most likely to donate: those with the resources (wealth, education) and motivation (interest) to do so.

[2] Prior work surveying donors has also relied on self-reported turnout.

In addition to this primary analysis, we also use these data to address two subsidiary questions. The first is why people contribute. In particular, one explanation for why certain citizens contribute, apart from their own ideological views, is that they perceive more at stake in elections because they view the parties as offering distinct policy alternatives, one of which they greatly prefer. We use our data to assess whether those who perceive their less preferred party as being relatively more ideologically distant than their preferred party are more likely to contribute.

The second question we examine is whether the candidate (or set of candidates) an individual contributes to is an accurate indicator of the individual's ideology. Recent work (Bonica 2014, Hall 2015, Hall and Snyder N.d.) has used contributions by individuals and groups to place candidates and contributors on a common ideological scale. These procedures produce estimates for elected officials that correlate well with roll-call based measures of legislator ideology for those candidates who serve in a legislature (e.g., Carrol et al. 2009), but it is unclear whether these patterns also reveal the ideological views of individual (i.e., non-elite) contributors. While prior work has described sophisticated models of giving for PACs and other elite actors (e.g., Romer and Snyder 1994), how individuals decide which candidates to support is less well understood. Accordingly, we assess whether one such donation-derived measure of individual ideology, Bonica's CFscore, reliably predicts variation in individual-level differences in policy preferences as measured using a rich battery of survey questions.

Our results add to our understanding of who makes campaign donations, why, and to what effect. We find that the demographic and ideological differences between donors and non-donors are consistently greater than the corresponding differences between voters and non-voters, a common measure of the implications for representation of unequal participation. Even when making comparisons within parties, we find donors are wealthier, more educated, more secular, older, less racially diverse, more likely to vote, and more ideologically extreme. For example, Democratic contributors are 10 percent black and 2 percent Hispanic, compared to 21 percent and 9 percent, respectively, of Democratic non-contributors. Contributors are also about 20 percentage points more likely to participate in primary elections than non-contributors, and between 6 and 9 points more likely to participate in general elections. Finally, contributors are substantially more extreme in both parties, even when compared to primary election voters.

Turning to our subsidiary questions, we show that the act of contributing is more likely the higher the stakes the individual perceives between the two parties. This pattern is consistent with a spatial model explanation for political participation in which the expected benefit to some form of activity is increasing in the relative loss associated with an individual's least preferred candidate winning office. Finally, we find that the relationship between individual-level policy preferences and donation-derived measures of ideology is weak within both parties. Within-party correlations between policy ideology and the CFscore are on the order of $r = 0.10$, suggesting that the CFscore measure calculated on the basis of donation patterns is not particularly powerful for estimating individual-level non-elite policy ideology.

The remainder of the essay proceeds as follows. We first discuss other research on individual donors. We then present our unique dataset, and use it to compare donors to non-donors on

demographics, participatory behaviors, and policy preferences. We then consider the effect of the perceived stakes of the election on contribution behavior and compare donor ideology measured using survey instruments to ideology measured using contribution behavior. Finally, we conclude.

Who Donates and Why?

Political scientists have long-noted the "upper-class" bias of those who participate in politics (Schattschneider 1960), a pattern that may be exacerbated when the participatory act—donating money—itself requires sufficient resources to do so. Thus, it is not surprising that survey data reveal that those who report contributing are not demographically representative of the larger electorate (e.g., Brady et al.1995). This research often relies on self-reports of individual-level donations behavior and other forms of participation (e.g., voting). A concern with this mode of observation, however, is that individuals may systematically misreport their behaviors in ways confounded with characteristics of interest to the researcher (see, in the context of voting, Vavreck 2007).[3]

Thus, a line of research by Powell and colleagues adopts the strategy of surveying a known set of donors identified from administrative records and comparing their attitudes and characteristics to those of the general population. For example, Brown et al. (1980) show contributors to the 1972 presidential campaigns (the first year of mandatory FEC reporting) are wealthier, report more forms of participation, and are more likely to view themselves ideologically and have policy views than the general population. Those contributors are not, however, more ideologically extreme in their issue positions. In contrast, Brown et al. (1995) report similarl demographic differences for contributors in 1988, but also find that donors are more ideologically extreme than both the general population and those who report voting in the general or primary elections.

More recently, Barber (2014a, 2014b) has conducted similar research surveying donors to 22 incumbent senators who sought reelection in 2012. Individual donors tend to rate ideological reasons (the positions of candidates or their opponents) as important in explaining their behavior, and ideological motivations are more frequent for more ideologically extreme donors. Additionally, Senators appear to better represent the preferences of their contributors than either members of their party or the general electorate, with preferences for the latter two groups measured using data drawn from the CCES.

Other research uses contribution behavior reported by the individual in the survey context. For example, Tobin and Rudolph (2002) show that reported donors during the 2000 presidential campaign are wealthier, older, more engaged, and more partisan than those who do not report giving, but do not appear to be more extreme in their policy attitudes. By contrast, Panagopoulos and Bergen (2006) find similar demographic differences, but also find that contributors are more extreme on some policy issues (See also Lipsitz and Panagopoulos 2011). Finally, in a recent analysis of reported donations behavior in the CCES survey, LaRaja

[3] See the Supplementary Information for a discussion of the accuracy of reported donation behavior in our merged data.

and Schaffner (2014) show contributors are substantially more extreme than the general population.

Overall, it does not appear that any prior research combines survey data on individual ideological views and perceptions of the parties together with administrative records of both electoral participation and donations behavior. Most of those studies that directly survey the broader pool of donors (e.g., donors to the 1988 presidential campaigns) are somewhat dated now, and so those data may not reflect the contemporary political or institutional climates.

Testing assumptions about why some individuals with the means to contribute do so, while others of means do not, is also a recurrent theme in this literature. A common finding is that those who are more extreme are more likely to participate, which is consistent with multiple theoretical perspectives. For example, individuals may prefer to support ideologically likeminded candidates. Alternatively, individuals may be more strategic and choose to donate when the utility difference they will experience if one party wins office is substantially different from what happens if the other party does so. Claassen (2007) examines multiple forms of self-reported participation, including contribution behavior, using American National Election Survey measures and finds support for the latter account.

Finally, if one presumes that contributions to a candidate are a revealed preference of one's ideological affinity for the candidate over other possible recipients, contributions may also indicate an individual's own ideological orientations. This logic is the basis for the Campaign Finance ideology score (CFscore) reported in Bonica (2014) and similar estimates of candidate locations used by Hall (2015) and Hall and Snyder (N.d.). To calculate the CFscore, for example, contributions by individuals and groups are used to place candidates and contributors on a common ideological scale. These procedures produce estimates for elected officials that correlate well with roll-call based measures of legislator ideology for those candidates who serve in a legislature. What is uncertain, however, is how well such measures capture individual-level differences in ideology among the mass public.

Data

Our dataset is created by merging individual-level data from three sources. First, the survey firm YouGov interviewed a nationally-representative sample of 54,535 American citizens during the 2012 presidential election as part of the 2012 CCES (Ansolabehere 2012). The survey included numerous measures for the respondents, including demographics and political attitudes and behaviors. Second, YouGov merged to the survey validated registration and turnout from state election records. This merge allows us to observe the actual, rather than reported, turnout and registration behavior of the respondents. YouGov matched 45,221 individuals to registration records, and this set of registered (potential) voters serves as the basis for our analysis. Given this construction, our comparisons are among the set of registered survey respondents.[4]

[4] We compare among registrants because almost all donors are registered and because those who are not registered cannot vote.

Third, we contracted with YouGov to match the 2012 CCES respondents to a subset of the DIME contributor records using names and addresses. YouGov has an established technology for matching multiple datasets using these identifiers. They were able to match 4,432 of the 45,221 records to a record in DIME, of which 3,820 (about 85 percent with survey weights) contributed during the 2012 election cycle.[5] In order to preserve each survey respondent's privacy, we could select only a subset of the measures available in the full DIME data and each selected measure was randomly perturbed by a small amount.[6] In particular, from the DIME data we have a measure of the number of contributions made in 2012 (binned into 8 categories), the total amount of contributions made in 2012 (binned into 10 categories), the cumulative Bonica CF score for each individual (ranging from approximately -7 to +6), and a dollar-weighted CF score calculated only on the basis of contributions made in 2012 (also ranging from -7 to +6). We describe our use of these measures below.

Note that to be recorded in federal contribution records an individual must have donated at least $200 to a single campaign, but that many of the state contribution databases included in the DIME have records for contributions of smaller sizes. Additionally, note that privacy restrictions prevent us from using these data to, for example, compare contributors to state elections with those who give only to presidential races, etc.

Demographic and Behavioral Differences between Donors and their Co-partisans

How representative is the population of donors—the donorate? Here we present a brief summary of these results; a complete analysis of the demographic and behavioral differences between donors and non-donors appears in the Supplementary Information (SI). To understand the substantive importance of these differences, we compare the size of the differences between donors and non-donors to another key measure of differential political participation: Those registrants who vote in general elections relative to those who do not vote. For all four comparisons, we show that the difference between donors and non-donors is notably larger than the difference between voters and non-voters.

We compare donors to non-donors, where someone is coded as a "donor" if they matched to a record in the DIME data. Throughout this paper, partisans are coded to include both identifiers and those who "lean" toward a party.[7] This analysis therefore excludes the modest number of pure independents and third-party adherents in our dataset. In each case, we compare donors to non-donors within party, which accounts for the demographic and behavioral differences between the parties along with differences in contribution rates.[8]

[5] We evaluate this matching process in the Supplementary Information.
[6] One concern is that this random perturbation induces measurement error that would tend to reduce the estimated magnitude of relationships between the DIME measures and other variables if such correlations otherwise existed. As this will tend to bias against finding relationships, we view this as an unlikely threat to inference in most of the analysis that follows. For our specific examination of the relationship between CFscores and individual-level policy ideology, we discuss below and present in the Supplementary Information our approach for assessing the potential importance of measurement error in driving the weak correlation that we find.
[7] Analysis excluding leaners is available upon request.
[8] For an account of differences between Democratic and Republican donors, see Francia et al. (2005).

With respect to demographics, we show in the SI that within each party donors have higher incomes and more education and are older, less diverse, and (among Democrats) more secular than non-donors. While some of these differences confirm prior research, we also present novel data assessing the importance of these differences. We show that the differences between donors and non-donors are larger in most cases than the differences between voters and non-voters.[9] To summarize these differences, we present in Table 1 the relative sizes of the differences between donors and non-donors compared to the differences between voters and non-voters.

<<Table 1 about here>>

Table 1 shows that within party, donors are notably different from non-donors on a variety of important demographics. Additionally, it presents parallel data for the differences between voters and non-voters. For example, Democratic donors are 19 percentage points more white than Democratic non-donors, while Democratic voters are only 8 points more white than Democratic non-voters. Similar comparisons for religion and race are less stark among Republicans. Finally, in the final two rows, we present differences in validated political behaviors. These differences are much more modest, and in most cases show bigger differences between (general election) voters and non-voters than between donors and non-donors.[10]

Contributors Hold More Extreme Policy Views than Non-Contributors

The summary of the demographic and behavioral analysis presented in the previous section shows that contributors are demographically distinct from, and vote more than, non-contributor registrants. Do they also have different attitudes? In this section, we show that contributors are more ideologically polarized than non-donors, a pattern that holds even when accounting for a variety of potentially confounding characteristics. On average, Democratic contributors are more liberal than other Democrats and Republican contributors are more conservative than other Republicans.

We first consider the relationship of donor status to individual policy ideology. To measure policy ideology, we estimate a factor analysis on a set of policy preference items from the 2012 CCES.[11] The included survey items measure policy preferences on a set of salient political issues: gun control, climate change, immigration, abortion, jobs versus the environment, gay marriage, affirmative action, and fiscal policy. This factor score is rescaled to range from -1

[9] Voters, in this case, are those with a validated turnout record from the 2012 presidential contest.
[10] We find that 6.1 percent of donors are not validated to have voted in either the 2012 general election or a 2012 primary election, and that 34.7 percent voted only in the general and 0.9 percent voted only in the primary.
[11] We apply Stata's maximum likelihood factor analysis to CCES variables CC320, CC321, CC322, CC324, CC325, CC326, CC327, CC328, and CC329. We first break each categorical item into a set of dummy variables for all responses (apart from one) for a single-factor analysis. Factor coefficients are reported in SI Table 2. The first factor has an eigenvalue of 5.3 and explains 34.6% of the variance. Using item response theory (IRT) models to estimate ideology yields similar results. (These results are available from the authors on request.) We have also estimated these models excluding the immigration items out of concern that they are related to foreign policy positions and find highly similar results.

(most liberal) to 1 (most conservative). In Figure 1 we plot the distribution of this measure of ideology. Panel A presents boxplots of ideology by party-contributor status. Contributors are more homogenous and less moderate than non-contributors for both parties. While Democratic contributors have a median ideology of -0.7 (5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles of -0.9 and -0.2), the corresponding number for non-contributors is -0.4 (-0.9 to 0.3). A similar pattern holds for Republicans, with a donor median of 0.6 (-0.1 to 0.9) compared to 0.4 (-0.4 to 0.9) for non-donors.

<<Figure 1 about here>>

To add perspective to the ideological distinction between donors and non-donors relative to the ideological differences associated with other forms of participation, Panel B plots kernel densities of ideology by party for different levels of political participation. We plot the densities separately for respondents validated to have donated in 2012, validated 2012 congressional primary voters, validated 2012 general election voters, and all registrants. In the left frame presenting the distributions for Democrats, we see that ideology is increasingly homogenous and more liberal with increasing participation. The narrowest and most liberal distribution of preference is for validated donors and the least narrow distribution is for all registrants. A similar, though less stark, pattern holds for Republicans on the right. Thus we observe increasing extremism and homogeneity within each party as participation increases (from none to general election voting to primary voting to contributing).

One concern is that donations are more likely for those who are wealthier and better educated. These same characteristics may be associated with more extreme policy views. Additionally, those who are better educated are also likely to have the most access to political information and the greatest ability to accurately express their preferences on a set of survey questions about public policy. This greater ability to engage the survey instrument might reduce measurement error and thereby introduce artificial extremism among those who participate more frequently.

To assess whether donor and validated turnout status are related to ideology when controlling for education, income, and other important factors, we run regression models predicting the policy ideology measure in each party using separate indicators for categories of income, union membership, education, religion, race, and age.[12] These estimates appear in Table 2. In columns (1) and (3), we model ideology solely as a function of variables for turnout and contributor status, while in columns (2) and (4) we include both these indicators and the control variables. (The indicators for contributor status and turnout are not mutually exclusive. For example, a contributor who also voted in both types of elections would be coded 1 for all three measures.) These regression results replicate the graphical pattern. Even after accounting for

[12] We also investigated preferences over tax policy, because one might imagine that wealthy Democratic contributors might oppose higher taxes and therefore prevent more populist Democratic tax policies. However, we found that Democratic contributors of more than $1,000 did not differ in their preferences over tax policy from non-contributors, and that contributors of less than $1,000 preferred tax cuts for the middle class, but not the wealthy, by about 10 percentage points more than non-contributors. For Republicans, support for tax cuts is high across the board, and increasing in size of contributions. Analysis available from the authors on request.

other differences across respondents within each party, ideology is increasingly extreme (more conservative for Republicans, more liberal for Democrats) with rising levels of participation as measured using either voting or contribution behavior.[13]

<<Table 2 about here>>

For example, among Republicans, per column (2), contributors are .08 units more conservative than a non-contributing primary voter, who is .095 units more conservative than a general election voter who does not vote in a primary, who is .094 units more conservative than a Republican who don't vote, all else equal.[14] By comparison, Republicans for whom religion is "extremely important" rather than "not too important" are about .07 units more conservative. Among Democrats, per column (4), general election voters are about .06 units more liberal than non-voters and primary voters are an addition .02 units more liberal. But validated contributors are substantially more liberal, by about .18 units. This effect is about the same as the .2 unit liberal shift associated with being a college graduate rather than never having finished high school.

The average Democrat and the average Republican differ by about .85 units on the ideology scale. Among contributors (assuming they did not also vote), this difference is 1.15 units, or about 36% larger. Thus, differences in ideology across the parties are also substantially larger among contributors than other partisans.

We also tested to see if the number or amount of donations was related to policy ideology, above and beyond whether or not the individual made any contribution. We ran two modifications to the specifications shown in columns (2) and (4). The first includes the number of contributions the individual made in 2012, and the second includes the dollar amount of 2012 contributions. For Republicans, neither the number nor the amount of contributions is statistically distinguishable from zero. For Democrats, number of contributions is statistically distinguishable from zero, with more contributions associated with being more liberal, but the substantive effect is very small. Within each party whether an individual contributed is a more important predictor of ideology than the number or amount of those contributions.[15]

Overall, we find that contributors are more ideological than non-contributors. In the SI (Figure S11), we present similar results for a scale calculated using foreign policy items (which measure the conditions under which the respondent believes the United States should intervene abroad). Unlike in the case of domestic policy preferences presented here, differences in foreign policy

[13] One concern is that random measurement error may be larger for less sophisticated respondents, making them appear more centrist, and sophistication may be correlated with other factors (e.g., income and education) that predict giving. For this reason, we have also replicated our analysis for respondents with high education level and high political interest, and find similar results with smaller magnitudes. Results available in SI Table S3.

[14] Because most contributors also vote in general and primary elections, and because most primary voters also vote in general elections, we order the comparisons in this way.

[15] These results are available in the replication archive or by request from authors.

attitudes are more minor when comparing contributors to non-contributors in each party.[16] Furthermore, comparing Democrats to Republicans, contributors are not more polarized than non-contributors.

Donations are Correlated with Perceptions of the Ideological Stakes of an Election

Those who give have different characteristics, behaviors, and attitudes from those who do not. Additionally, and perhaps more saliently, donors are more extreme in their policy views. This leads naturally to seeking to understand why these individuals contribute. Here, we consider multiple explanations for this pattern. We show that registrants who perceive more at stake in the election, as measured by their relative perceived proximity to the two parties, are more likely to contribute. We show that the relationship to perceived proximity holds even when we control for the direct relationship with each individual's personal policy ideology as well as how close she is to her preferred party.

One explanation for why more ideologically extreme individuals are more likely to contribute is that extremity leads one to participate more in an effort to pursue non-median outcomes. For example, if people are more dissatisfied as policies move away from their preferences, then individuals who are more extreme have more to lose if they forgo donating or voting and allow median outcomes to persist.[17] For example, liberal donors may give to candidate *L* to encourage her not to move too far to the center in pursuit of votes. At the same time, there is a general consensus in the United States that both parties pursue non-median policies, in which case concerns about moderate policies may not be the most salient motivation for contribution behavior.

A second possibility is that it is not extremity, and therefore the fear of non-median outcomes, that drives contribution behavior, but instead how closely a citizen feels a party aligns with her own views. In this account, individuals are more likely to support a party and its candidates when they perceive the party as offering an ideological position close to their own (a loyalty view). Indeed, this account stresses ideological proximity in a way that presupposes voters are somewhat myopic, considering only the fit between their personal preferences and a given party, and not the relative desirability of that party compared to the likely alternative of the other party winning office. For example, liberal donors give to candidate *L* the more they agree with his policies, regardless of the policies offered by candidate *R*.

Finally, a third explanation focuses not on the difference between the median voter and more extreme voters or on the ideological proximity of each party, but instead on the fact that electoral competition in the United States is structured by partisan competition. In particular, because the political parties offer competing and relatively divergent policy alternatives, voters do not face a choice between the median voter's preferred policy and their own, or between their preferred party and nothing at all, but between two partisan bundles. This means that for

[16] This is consistent with work by Jacobs and Page (2005), who find that the mass public's attitudes on foreign policy appears largely unrelated to elite foreign policy preferences. This may be because most members of the mass public lack well-formed views about these questions.

[17] Of course, an equilibrium in which only extremists contribute and therefore win on policy grounds may not be sustainable if there are centrist voters.

most standard models of policy utility, extreme voters have more to lose from the other party winning office than do centrists. For example, liberal donors compare how much they like the policies of candidate *L* relative to the policies offered by candidate *R* to determine whether to give to *L*.

To illustrate this logic, consider a simple one-dimensional spatial model in which voters have a preferred policy x_i and gain utility $-(x_i-X)^2$ when policy X is implemented. There are two parties, the left and the right, which respectively offer and pursue policies $x_l=-1$ and $x_r=1$ if elected. Voters are distributed uniformly on the interval -2 to 2, with a median voter $x_m=0$.[18]

In this model, it is easy to see that the expected utility loss to a voter of the election being won by the more ideologically distant party is larger when the voter is more extreme. For example, for the median voter, her expected utility is -1 if either party wins office, and so she is indifferent as to who wins. For a voter whose ideal point is the same as the left party, her expected utility is -2 if the right party wins and 0 if the left party wins, which yields a difference of 2. But for a voter whose ideal point is even farther to the left at $x_i=-2$, her utility if the left party wins is -1 but if the right party wins it is -4, a difference of 3. Results are the same if one considers right-leaning voters who face the prospects of a left-wing victor.

In this situation, which voter would be most willing to bear a personal cost to increase the chances that their preferred party wins office?[19] Holding all else constant, it is those who have the most to lose if the other party wins instead of their preferred party. So far, we have assumed that voters share common beliefs about their own ideological self-placement and their perceptions of the parties, but if one allows individuals to vary in their assessments both of their own ideological placement and of the positions of the parties, one can estimate each individual's perceived policy loss associated with the other "team" winning.[20] Most simply, setting aside questions of scaling and strategic responses by other voters, if one assumes quadratic policy loss then the cost any voter would be willing to experience now to decide the election would be proportional to $|(x_i-x_r)^2 - (x_i-x_l)^2|$.

Examining this equation provides some clarity for its intuition. Specifically, consider a left-leaning voter who is closer to the left party than the right party ($|x_i-x_l|<|x_i-x_r|$) and more centrist than the left party ($x_l<x_i<0$). What happens to this voter's calculations as the right party moves farther right? That will increase the quantity $(x_i-x_r)^2$, which will increase the value of acting to influence the election. Similarly, if the left party moves closer to the voter, this will decrease $(x_i-x_l)^2$, which also increases the willingness to act now.

[18] This model abstracts away from the question of where party positions come from or why, *ex ante*, the parties do not converge. In doing so, it also sets aside the question of whether donations are motivated by a desire to shape primary election outcomes.

[19] An alternative phrasing of the question is "which voters are more likely to make an expressive (rather than instrumental) contribution given the stakes they perceive?". In either case, whether the choice is motivated by a desire to influence the election or just to express one's view about it, the central intuition is the same, which is that perceived stakes will increase the benefit of doing so relative to the costs.

[20] For simplicity, this exposition ignores the question of whether individuals differ in their assessments of each party's chances of winning office absent contribution behavior, how contributions influence elections, or the individual cost of contributing.

We test these competing theoretical explanations for why individuals contribute using statistical models where the outcome variable is whether a registrant is a matched contributor (1=yes, 0=no). The first key independent variable is *Distance Farther^2-Distance Closer^2*, which is coded as ideological distance to the farther party squared minus distance to the closer party squared.[21] Distance to each party is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the individual's ideological placement of herself and that party, with each placement measured using a 7-point ideology scale ranging from Very Liberal to Very Conservative. (To calculate each party's placement, we take the average of the respondent's ideological placement of the party and of the party's presidential nominee.[22]) If a larger expected loss leads to a greater willingness to act, the coefficient on the *Distance Farther^2-Distance Closer^2* variable should be positive.

To examine the two other theoretical perspectives introduced above, we calculate two additional variables. The first is a measure of the respondent's ideological extremity, coded as *Absolute value of self-placement ideology*. This is a "folded" measure of ideology, with moderates at 0 and very liberal and very conservative individuals at 3. If extremity leads to greater motivation to pursue non-median policies, then the coefficient on this measure should be positive. The second measure is *Distance to closer party*, which is simply the absolute value of the difference between a respondent's own ideological placement and her placement of the ideology of the party closer to her. If proximity encourages participation, the coefficient on distance to closer party should be negative. Finally, a third control variable we discuss below is *Distance between parties*, which is simply the absolute value of the difference between the respondent's ideological placement of each party.

Table 3 presents results from this analysis. All models are OLS regressions with robust standard errors. In column (1), we present a baseline model and find that increasing quadratic loss is associated with a greater propensity to contribute ($p<.01$). In columns (2) and (3) we repeat this specification separately for self-identified Democrats (2) and Republicans (3) and find that greater expected loss is associated with more frequent contributions for both groups ($p<.01$).

<<Table 3 about here>>

In terms of magnitude, 7% of Republicans are contributors in this dataset. Holding constant a Republican's own self-placement at 6 (Conservative) and their placement of the Republican Party at 7 (Very conservative), we can assess how their predicted probability of contributing changes as they perceive the Democratic party as becoming more liberal. When they perceive the Democrats as moderate (at 4), their quadratic loss variable is 3, and they are predicted to be .3 percentage points more likely to contribute than if they perceived the Democrats and Republicans as equally distant from their own ideology. By contrast, if they perceive that the

[21] We have also estimated models in which we assume policy loss is linear in the relative distance between the two parties. For the entire sample, as well as for Democrats and Republicans separately, we continue to find evidence that greater expected policy loss is associated with a greater willingness to contribute.

[22] We obtain similar results if we instead use either the party or candidate placement measures. Results are available upon request.

Democrats are as extreme as their own party (located at 1), their quadratic loss score is 24 and they are predicted to be 2.3 points more likely to contribute than if they were equidistant from the two parties, all else equal. So, moving from perceiving the Democrats as moderate to extreme increases their predicted contribution rate by 2.3 points, all else equal, which represents a 33% increase in the predicted rate of contributing over the baseline rate for Republicans. Calculations for Democrats are similar in proportional terms.[23]

In columns (4) and (5), we assess whether these results are robust to including a measure of individual ideological extremity, the key theoretical predictor in the model where extremists are seeking to prevent median outcomes. The variable has inconsistent signs for the two groups, suggesting extremism alone does not explain contribution behavior. Including this measure diminishes the coefficient for the *Distance Farther^2-Distance Closer^2* variable for Democrats and increases it for Republicans, but in both cases the quadratic loss variable remains significant ($p<.01$). Focusing on the new variable, for Democrats moving from moderate to extremely liberal is associated with a 3 point increase in the predicted probability of contributing ($p<.01$), but for Republicans the effect is negative and not statistically significant.

In columns (6) and (7), we incorporate the measure of *Distance to the closer party*, the key variable in the proximity model. Including this measure has almost no effect on the estimated coefficient for *Distance Farther^2-Distance Closer^2*. However, the coefficient on *Distance to the closer party* is *positive,* which means citizens are less, not more, likely to give when they perceive the closest party as ideologically similar to them.

Similarly, in columns (8) and (9) we consider the possibility that perceived polarization affects contributions (it could be that polarization causes people to believe the stakes of the election are higher, which would tend to increase participation, or that it instead causes them to believe neither party will do a good job of representing their views, which could alienate them and therefore diminish participation). Greater perceptions of polarization, measured using *Distance between parties*, are associated with fewer contributions for both groups, but *Distance Farther^2-Distance Closer^2* remains positive and statistically significant for members of both parties.

Finally, in columns (10) and (11) we include both *Distance Farther^2-Distance Closer^2* and the other measures and find that the quadratic loss variable remains significant (and, in fact, has a larger effect than in the earlier specifications). The effect of one's own perception of self-ideological extremity is now negative for both Democrats and Republicans (although it is statistically significant only for the latter), providing little evidence for the view that more extreme individuals are intrinsically more engaged. As before, the proximity account finds little support: Greater distance to the closer party increases, rather than decreases, rates of giving. Finally, polarization continues to be associated with fewer contributions, supporting the alienation account.

[23] For a Democrat whose self-placement is liberal and perceives the Democratic Party as very liberal, moving from perceiving the Republican Party as moderate to perceiving it as very conservative increases the predicted rate of contribution by 6.9 points. This is a proportional increase of 46% relative to the baseline for Democrats in this sample.

One limitation of this analysis is that we lack a source of exogenous variation in perceptions of the ideological positions of the two parties. It could be that the types of individuals who are motivated to give also inflate their reported divergence from their least preferred party or instead minimize their reported ideological differences from their more preferred party. This pattern could also arise through a process of reverse causality if engagement with politics leads to perceptions of the greater polarization of the parties. (Such a pattern could also arise through measurement error, if less engaged individuals give less and also provide more moderate assessments of the party's positions.) This is an important and well-understood weakness of all observational analysis of survey data. We take two steps to address these potential sources of bias, but we acknowledge that we cannot rule out these alternative accounts.

In an attempt to address the first concern about inflating self-reported divergence to justify donations, we ran our models separately for each party and each category of ideological self-placement. This holds fixed where the individual places themself and exploits only variation in reported placement of the two parties. For Republicans, we find largely consistent patterns, with the largest positive effect of quadratic loss for Republicans who place themselves as "middle of the road" or "somewhat conservative" (differences in these point estimates are not statistically significant). We also find the largest effect of the quadratic loss measure among Democrats who place themselves as "middle of the road," but we find an unexpected and statistically significant negative coefficient for "somewhat conservative" Democrats. Again, however, few of the differences across individual ideology are statistically significant.

To address the second concern about reverse causality, that individuals alter their placement of the parties to justify their own giving, we ran separate models for low and high education Democrats and Republicans, again using the same specifications as in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3. We expect less educated (used here as a proxy for sophistication) respondents to be less likely to consciously alter their placement of the parties to justify their behavior. We separated the sample approximately in half, with low education those with some college or less, and high education those with a 2-year college degree or more. As one might expect, the coefficients on quadratic loss for the high educated are about 2.5 times larger among both Republicans and Democrats than the coefficient for low education respondents. Nonetheless, the coefficients among low education respondents are still statistically significant from zero, suggesting that our results are not solely driven by the most educated or interested political participants.[24]

Overall, these results provide new evidence that individuals who perceive more is at stake in a given electoral environment are more likely to participate by contributing. Contributors are more extreme on average than non-contributors, but it does not appear to be extremism itself that motivates participation. Nor is it that those who believe one party offers positions closer to their own are more likely to give (instead, ideological proximity alone is associated with reduced giving). Finally, simply believing that the parties offer stark choices, all else equal, reduces giving. Instead, it is individuals who perceive they have much more to lose if their non-preferred party wins relative to their preferred party that are most likely to give.

[24] Results for both of these tests are available in the replication archive or from the authors on request.

Ideology of Recipient Candidates Is a Weak Predictor of Contributor Ideology among the Mass Public

The final question we examine is whether the ideologies of the candidates and groups that an individual gives to are an accurate measure of the individual's personal ideology. In particular, the revealed-preference model underlying the construction of the CFscore (Bonica 2014) and similar measure of individual ideology (Hall 2015, Hall and Snyder N.d.) assumes that a candidate's pattern of support is a measure both of the candidate's ideology and the ideology of those who give to the candidate (e.g., Bonica 2014, p. 369, eq. 1). These measures appear to provide reasonable estimates of candidate ideology, but whether they also provide useful estimates of contributor ideology is unknown. To date, we have lacked a direct measure of donors' policy ideology. If contribution patterns reveal individual ideology, it would allow for indirect observation of citizen ideology, an important factor in many important theoretical accounts of political behavior.

To answer this question, we again take advantage of the CCES's battery of policy questions to estimate a granular measure of individual-level ideology. This is the factor analysis policy ideology scale we introduced above. We examine the relationship between individual-level policy ideology and individual-level estimated CFscores. Because our measure of policy ideology is taken in October 2012, we create a CFscore for each respondent that is specific to the year 2012. We calculate the dollar-weighted average CFscore of the candidates to which the donor gave in the 2012 cycle and use this as the donor's 2012 CFscore for the analysis here. This construction allows us to assess whether the ideology of the set of candidates contributed to in 2012 is an accurate indicator of the donor's 2012 policy preferences.[25]

Our analysis appears in Figure 2. Panel A plots the density of individual-level CFscores among matched contributors in our dataset by self-identified partisanship. These data are bimodal, with Democrats clustered on the left and Republicans on the right. (The small number of "Others" [Independents and third party identifiers] who are in the contributor data, about 4% of the sample, tend slightly liberal.)

<<Figure 2 about here>>

In panel B, we plot the density of individual-level policy ideology for those respondents who appear in Panel A. As with the CFscores, this measure is also highly bimodal, with Democrats clustered on the left and conservatives on the right. If both measures are bimodal, is it also the case that more ideologically extreme (moderate) members of each party are also estimated to have more extreme (moderate) CFscores? In order to address this question, we turn to Panel C, which plots the individual-level relationship between the CFscore measure of ideology and the policy ideology scale.

Each point matches a respondent's policy ideology score (vertical axis) to their CFscore (horizontal axis). Democrats are plotted as black circles, Republicans as grey squares, and

[25] We explore other versions of CFScore as well as self-reported ideology in the SI, and find similar results.

"Others" as light grey triangles. As one would expect, Democrats are largely clustered in the lower left quadrant and Republicans mostly in the upper right. Additionally, the overall relationship between these two variables is upward sloping, as is shown by dashed black line which is a locally weighted polynomial smoother of the individual-level relationship between the CFscore and policy ideology.

As is also clear from the plot, the individual-level relationship between the CFscore and policy ideology is relatively weak within parties. That is, among the Democrats clustered in the lower left portion of the figure, large changes in CFscores are related to only small changes in policy ideology. Thus, the slope of the polynomial smoother is nearly flat in the lower left quadrant of the figure, increases in the middle of the figure (where there are very few moderate CFscores), and then is again nearly flat in the upper right quadrant.[26] Using all of these data, the within-party correlations between the CFscore and policy ideology are $r = 0.48$ for Republicans and $r = 0.10$ for Democrats.[27,28]

To make this point even clearer, in panel D we plot only the data for Democrats and Republicans after restricting attention to cases with CFscores between the 10th and 90th percentiles in each party to lessen the influence of outlying cases. Among Democrats, the middle 80% of CFscores (between the 10th and 90th percentiles) range from -1.61 and -1.20, and for Republicans from 0.78 to 1.38. For Democrats, moving from the bottom 10% of plotted CFscores to the top 10% is predicted to increase policy ideology by .005 units, which is about 2% of a standard deviation of this measure for this sample. For Republicans, a comparable shift increases predicted ideology by about .08 units, or about one third of a standard deviation for this sample. Overall, within party, and particularly for Democrats, variation in CFscores does not appear to explain variation in our measure of policy ideology.[29,30]

[26] If instead of conditioning on party we simply divided the CFscores into 3 bins, with one cut at -.5 and another at .5, we see similar results. Within the bottom and top bins, CFscores are only weakly related to variation in individual-level policy ideology.

[27] One concern is that because our CFscore measure is perturbed by a small amount of random noise to protect respondent privacy, this will tend to depress the relationship between policy ideology and the CFscore measure even if a somewhat stronger relationship existed. To assess this possibility, we present in the SI three explorations of the potential effects of measurement error on these estimates using bootstrap resamples and alternative measures of both ideology and CFscore. In each case, our evidence is consistent with the weak relationship between individual ideology and CFscore within party that we present here in the main body.

[28] Even the 0.48 correlation for Republicans is driven by a handful of liberal self-identified Republicans (4.4 percent of Republican contributors have CFscores less than 0, among whom 30 percent report voting for Barack Obama in 2012). The correlation between ideology and CFscore for Republican contributors with a CFscore greater than 0 is $r = 0.12$. Across our bootstrap iterations described in the footnote above, this correlation takes a maximum value of 0.14.

[29] We have also replicated this analysis using a different outcome measure: Approval for Obama minus Approval for Congress. As with the policy ideology measure, we see large differences between the parties, but within parties, the CFscore measure does not predict much of the observed variation.

[30] In SI Figure S12, we reproduce frame (d) of Figure 2 separately for donors who made only one donation, donors who made 2-4 donations, and donors who made 5+ donations in 2012. These plots allow us to assess whether the relationship is stronger for donors who have made more donations, and whose CFscore may be estimated with more accuracy. We do not find any evidence of stronger

The key implication of this finding is that in comparing among the partisans who give to their party's candidates it may be incorrect to presume that the set of candidates one gives to is a valid indicator of the individual's ideology. Instead, it appears that contributions clearly distinguish which party the contributor supports, but that within each party coalition, contributors' policy ideology is only weakly related to the ideology one would estimate based upon the candidates to which they donate and the set of donations those candidates receive from other groups and individual donors. These conclusions are somewhat tentative given the various sources of measurement error in merging and estimation, but they suggest more work is merited before viewing donors' CFscores as reliable estimates of individual-level ideology.

Discussion and Conclusion

Money is the lifeblood of politics, but our understanding of the population of contemporary contributors and how they are different from other potential voters is somewhat limited. In this paper, we present novel survey data merged to administrative records about who contributes and votes to understand the demographic and ideological representativeness of the "donorate" relative to the larger potential electorate of registered voters. We show that donors are less demographically diverse, older, wealthier, and better educated than their fellow partisans. Furthermore, they participate at higher rates and hold more extreme policy views.

Of course, our analysis provide insights only into a particular subset of donors (those who participate in the CCES and are successfully matched to their contribution records in DIME). As such, they are subject to important concerns about representativeness and whether the patterns we observe in this context would replicate in other elections and years. These caveats aside, there is no reason this basic approach cannot be repeated, potentially providing a panel analysis of campaign contributions over time matched with survey data. Indeed, the value of this analysis may be such that it should become standard practice to merge not just voting behavior, but also administrative records of campaign giving, to large scale survey efforts. As this analysis shows, in doing so we can obtain new insights in the composition of the donor base, as well as their policy views and apparent motivations for giving.

Moreover, it may be useful to conduct similar analysis not just in the United States, but also in other settings where both voting and contribution records are publicly available. While such approaches have previously been confined to the United States, understanding whether similar issues of representativeness arise in other democratic governments is an important issue in comparative political economy and comparative political behavior. Any such effort will have to grapple with the same concerns about subject privacy that we address, but it is precisely because of the value of these data that those concerns are likely to arise.

Although our findings on demographics confirm earlier research, one unique advantage of our data is that these measures of participation and contribution behavior are not subject to the potential reporting biases associated with self-reported voting and contributing. Additionally, our

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relationships across the frames, or in a regression context (regression results available from the authors on request).

data allow us to assess the magnitudes of the differences between donors and non-donors compared to differences by voter participation.

The fact that moderates are less likely to give remains a puzzle if donations are instrumental, in that a setting in which contributors are extreme and parties pursue non-median policy outcomes would seem ripe for centrists to donate. Put differently, if one's benchmark model is a simple median voter account in which parties are competing for the median voter, why are centrists ignored in many cases and why do they not respond by pulling the parties toward them? Our analysis of why people give provides somewhat of an understanding: Donation behavior responds more to relative than to absolute policy positions. Centrists thus perceive less at stake than their more extreme counterparts, who view the chances of their less preferred party winning office with greater concern. That is, so long as the parties are roughly equally distant from the median voter, centrists have less to lose from one party winning rather than the other by sitting on the sidelines compared to more extreme voters who perceive one party as offering a far superior policy bundle. Thus, a simple spatial model of the expected ideological cost of forgoing voting explains giving patterns better than measures of respondent extremity, proximity to one party, or perceptions of polarization.

Our finding that donations appear to be motivated by perceptions of the stakes in the election outcome also has implications for the way in which candidates and campaigns seek to raise money. Centrists, for example, are not useful targets unless they perceive one party as substantially more extreme. In fact, across all levels of voter ideology, our findings imply that those seeking donations have an incentive to exaggerate the perceived extremity of the other party. It is this incentive that may motivate the obtuse statements made by candidates in closed-door fundraisers that are occasionally leaked to the public, e.g. Mitt Romney's discussion of the "47 percent" or Barack Obama's denigration of rural voters who "cling to guns or religion or antipathy toward people who aren't like them." These very likely could be conscious attempts to make contributors feel that the threat of the other party winning office is too large to simply sit on the sidelines.

Finally, this work also implies some caution about using measures of individual-level ideology derived from which candidates a citizen supports with her campaign donations. While patterns of donations *across* the parties seem to accurately capture partisan ideological divides, within parties these patterns are weak. In other words, factors apart from policy ideology appear to explain variation in which candidates a citizen supports, suggesting that donation data may not be particularly valuable to impute individual-level policy ideology.

For those concerned with understanding the dynamics of contemporary American party politics, our results offer mixed evidence. On the one hand, that moderates are underrepresented among donors is one potential explanation for the ideological pull of the parties toward the extremes. On the other hand, if one is concerned that those with money are inherently more conservative than those with less resources, finding that Democratic contributors are more liberal than other Democrats should reduce fears that the party of the left is constrained in its policy positions by the views of its donors. Pluralism may yet have some chance to hold.

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Table 1: Demographic and Behavioral Differences By Donation and Turnout Behavior

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Difference in Percentage with Characteristic			*Difference in Percentage with Characteristic*		
Characteristic	Donors vs Non-Donors	Voters vs Non-Voters	Ratio of differences	Donors vs Non-Donors	Voters vs Non-Voters	Ratio of differences
Family income > $100K	21.73	5.36	4.05	18.17	6.13	2.97
Education 4-year college+	31.6	13.05	2.42	25.84	9.95	2.6
Age 50+	30.71	14.97	2.05	24.03	13.86	1.73
Religion very important	-9.2	-0.96	9.57	1.37	7.24	0.19
Race not white	-18.99	-7.77	2.44	-0.61	-5.61	0.11
Voted 2012 congressional primary	32.41	31.1	1.04	30.87	42.81	0.72
Registered with major party in party registration state	8.92	27.42	0.33	11.4	32.61	0.35

Note: For each party, the first two columns present the percentage point difference between donors (voters) and non-donors (non-voters) who match the category of that row. The third column is the ratio of these two differences. The larger the ratio, the greater the relative difference for donors over voters.

Table 2: Predicting Policy Ideology Using Contributor Status, Multivariate Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ideological scale from policy items (-1=Lib, 1=Cons)			
	Republicans	Republicans	Democrats	Democrats
Is a contributor (matched to CCES case, 1=yes)	0.125	0.080	-0.264	-0.178
	[0.013]***	[0.013]***	[0.008]***	[0.008]***
Validated 2012 General Vote (1=yes, 0=no, .=unknown)	0.130	0.094	-0.080	-0.057
	[0.008]***	[0.007]***	[0.006]***	[0.005]***
Validated 2012 Cong. Primary Vote (1=yes, 0=no, .=unknown)	0.137	0.095	-0.033	-0.018
	[0.006]***	[0.006]***	[0.006]***	[0.005]***
Constant	0.177	-0.027	-0.314	-0.222
	[0.007]***	[0.024]	[0.005]***	[0.019]***
Observations	17718	17718	21284	21284
Demographic indicators? [detailed in Note below]	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-squared	0.070	0.160	0.070	0.190
Mean of DV	0.400	0.400	-0.450	-0.450
SD of DV	0.380	0.380	0.350	0.350

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets

Note: Dependent variable is policy ideology scale, which ranges from -1 (Liberal) to 1 (Conservative).

Indicators for contribution status and participation are not mutually exclusive.

Indicators for each category of income, education, gender, household union membership, race, age in decades, and importance of religion suppressed.

Table 3: Predicting Contributor Status using Perceptions of Election Stakes, Multivariate Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Spatial model	Democrats	Republicans	Robustness: With Self-Placement, Democrats	Robustness: With Self-Placement, Republicans	Robustness: With Distance to Closer, Democrats	Robustness: With Distance to Closer, Republicans	Robustness: With Party Polarization, Democrats	Robustness: With Party Polarization, Republicans	Robustness: Saturated Model, Democrats	Robustness: Saturated Model, Republicans
(Distance to Farther Party)^2 - (Distance to Closer Party)^2	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.004	0.003
	[0.0001]***	[0.0003]***	[0.0002]***	[0.0004]***	[0.0003]***	[0.0003]***	[0.0002]***	[0.0003]***	[0.0003]***	[0.0005]***	[0.0005]***
Absolute value of self placement ideology (0-3)				0.011	-0.006					0.000	-0.020
				[0.0036]***	[0.0041]					[0.0043]	[0.0047]***
Distance to closer party (0-6)						0.007	0.008			0.007	0.010
						[0.0032]**	[0.0028]***			[0.0033]**	[0.0028]***
Distance between parties (0-6)								-0.011	-0.004	-0.011	-0.008
								[0.0020]***	[0.0018]**	[0.0024]***	[0.0021]***
Constant	-0.055	-0.099	-0.044	-0.105	-0.042	-0.106	-0.052	-0.073	-0.031	-0.079	-0.024
	[0.0120]***	[0.0162]***	[0.0203]**	[0.0164]***	[0.0203]**	[0.0164]***	[0.0202]***	[0.0166]***	[0.0214]	[0.0174]***	[0.0215]
Observations	37010	16939	16406	16939	16406	16939	16406	16939	16406	16939	16406
Demographic indicators? [detailed in Note below]	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.090	0.130	0.060	0.130	0.060	0.130	0.060	0.130	0.060	0.130	0.060
Mean of DV	0.110	0.150	0.070	0.150	0.070	0.150	0.070	0.150	0.070	0.150	0.070
SD of DV	0.310	0.360	0.250	0.360	0.250	0.360	0.250	0.360	0.250	0.360	0.250

Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Dependent variable is whether respondent is a matched contributor (1=yes, 0=no)

Note: Indicators for each category of income, education, gender, household union membership, race, age in decades, and importance of religion suppressed.

Figure 1: Ideology of Contributors and Non-Contributors, by Party





Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure 2: Relationship between Policy Ideology and Estimated CFscore by Party



Note: Partisans include leaners. See text for details. Source: Merged CCES/DIME.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR

Representativeness and Motivations of Contemporary Contributors to Political Campaigns: Results from Merged Survey and Administrative Records

Seth J. Hill
Assistant Professor
University of California, San Diego
Department of Political Science
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
sjhill@ucsd.edu

Gregory A. Huber
Professor
Yale University
Department of Political Science
Institution for Social and Policy Studies
77 Prospect Street, PO Box 208209
New Haven, CT 06520-8209
gregory.huber@yale.edu

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Evaluation of the Matching Process

In this section, we evaluate the details and success of our match from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME, Bonica 2013) to the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES, Ansolabehere 2012). The survey organization (YouGov) that fielded the CCES matched their records to the DIME contribution records using first name, last name, and address. Because this required access to individual-identifying data, we were not privy to all details of the match, but we were told that this is a common practice for YouGov, for instance when they merge their respondents to administrative voter files. We identified unique contributors from the 2010 and 2012 DIME compilations of individual contributors and coarsened the variables of number and size of contributions to limit potential reverse identification of YouGov respondents. We sent to YouGov a data file of 6.2 million individual contributors with names, addresses, CF scores, and number and size of 2010 and 2012 contributions. YouGov matched 4,432 of the 54,535 American citizens from the CCES to one of the contributor records. According the Michael McDonald's data (http://www.electproject.org/2012g), in 2012 the voting age population was 240.9 million, suggesting that the DIME compilation captured about 2.5 percent of the voting age population making contributions in 2010 or 2012. YouGov matched DIME contributor records to 8.1 percent of the 2012 CCES records. This higher rate of contribution suggests the CCES sample is composed of more politically engaged individuals; for our purposes, this fact may bias against our finding differences between donors and non-donors in this more politically engaged sample.

In order to prevent identification of survey respondents, YouGov added random noise to the data returned for the 4,432 matches. Specifically, the variables number of contributions and amount of contributions are categorical, and with probability 0.075 YouGov shifted the actual category up by one value (e.g. moving total contributions from the $1-$25 category up to the $26-$50 category) and with probability 0.075 down by one category (e.g. moving total contributions from the $26-$50 category down to the $1-$25 category). All continuous CF Score variables were perturbed by a random uniform draw on the interval [-0.1, 0.1]. All noise was added at random.

To benchmark the merge, we compare self-reported contribution behavior to merged contribution behavior. Of those respondents who report making a contribution to a candidate, campaign, or political organization, 25% are matched to a donor record, compared with 1% of respondents who report making no contributions but who are matched to a donor record. Of those who report making more than $300 in contributions, 54% match to a donor record. We do find some difference in the match success by party. Among respondents who self-report giving $300 or more in 2012, 60% of Democrats match to a contributor record but 32% of Republicans match. This suggests we do a better job matching Democratic donors to records. Potential bias from this differential match are unclear, but we note that most comparisons in this paper are made within rather than across party.

We also investigate success of match to amount of contributions. In Figure S1, we compare the proportion of CCES matched donors to the proportion of all DIME donors by size of total contributions. Among those making a contribution, we match many more small donors than

large donors, perhaps due to our better match rate for Democrats who gave in smaller amounts in 2012. We have relatively fewer large donors than the DIME data, but overall match rates are relatively uniform by total donations amounts apart from very small donors. Again, the source of this discrepancy could be many, as the DIME compilation has potential sources of error, as well.

Finally, we compare the CF Score for matched donors compared to all donors in Figure S2. Here we plot kernel density estimates of the distribution of dollar-weighted CF Scores separately for our matched donors and for all donors in the DIME data. We find relatively similar distributions, subject again to the caveat that we appear less likely to match conservatives than liberals.

Demographic Differences between Donors and their Co-partisans

How representative is the population of donors—the donorate? We begin by examining the educational attainment and income of donors, two characteristics of central concern in understanding the bias associated with being a donor, because those without the means to contribute are effectively precluded from participating in this way. We then consider how much more donors participate in elections than non-donors, and finally consider the ideological and policy attitudes of donors relative to non-donors. In each case, we account for partisanship, which could be a key confounder because Republicans are, on average, wealthier than Democrats.[1] Overall, we find important divergence between donor and non-donor registrants along each of these dimensions, even when controlling for partisanship and income.

To understand the substantive importance of these differences, we compare the magnitudes of these differences to another important source of variation in participation: Those registrants who vote in general elections relative to those who do not vote. For each comparison, we show that the difference between donors and non-donors is notably larger than the difference between voters and non-voters.

We first compare the demographic characteristics of contributors and non-contributors. In Figure S3, we present the distributions of income, age, and education by whether or not the individual is a contributor. Someone is coded as a contributor if they matched to a record in the DIME data. Each panel presents four columns, one each for Democratic contributors and non-contributors ("Dem Yes" and "Dem No", 4.6 and 45.6 percent of all respondents in our sample) and one each for Republican contributors and non-contributors ("Rep Yes" and "Rep No", 1.7 and 35.3 percent). In each column, each row is the percentage of that group that has the outcome listed on the vertical axis.[2] For example, the upper left cell in panel A shows that 11 percent of Democratic contributors have a family income less than $30,000, while the bottom left cell shows that 37 percent of Democratic contributors have family incomes greater than $100,000. By contrast, in the second column, we see that among non-contributor Democrats, 13 percent earn more than $100,000. A similar pattern of greater wealth among contributors holds

[1] As we discuss below, this also mitigates against concerns that there are differences in how Democrats and Republicans give (for example, whether they use a work or home address when reporting contributions) that might affect the ease of matching contributors to survey respondents across parties.
[2] All descriptive statistics reported in this paper are weighted using the CCES survey weights.

among self-identified Republicans, with 40 percent (compared to 16 percent of non-donors) having family income above $100,000.

It is clear from Panel A that contributors on average have higher incomes. A similar pattern holds for education in Panel B. Fully 28 percent of Democratic contributors and 23 percent of Republican contributors have a post-graduate degree, compared to just 9 and 8 percent of non-contributors, respectively. Meanwhile, those with a high school degree or less make up 41 and 38 percent of non-contributing Democrats and Republicans, compared to 11 and 16 percent of contributors. A similar pattern holds in Panel C, which plots the distribution of age (in decades) for these groups. The median contributor is in their 60s while for non-contributors it is in their 50s. Furthermore, while only 10 percent of contributors are under the age of 40, almost 30 percent of registered voters are less than 40 years old.

The differences between donors and non-donors shown in Figure S3 are somewhat striking. However, it is difficult to put them in context. For example, is the fact that 40% of Republican donors have incomes over $100,000 when only 16% of Republican non-donors do a large difference? One way to understand the magnitude of these differences is to compare the same outcomes for those who voted in the 2012 election to those who did not. These comparisons appear in Figure S6. Across the three frames comparing income, education, and age, it is clear that the differences between voters and non-voters are much smaller than those between donors and non-donors. For example, while Democratic identifiers making more than $100,000 make up 37 percent of contributors but only 13 percent of non-contributors, a compositional difference of almost 25 points, the comparable figures by turnout are 16 percent (voters) and 10 percent (non-voters), a difference of only 6 points. Differences on education and age are also more muted by participation. This comparison suggests that making campaign donations is a more differentiating behavior than voting in presidential elections.

Differences between contributors and non-contributors on age, education, and income are perhaps not surprising. In Figure S4, we consider other characteristics for which we have less clear prior expectations: race and the importance of religion. In Panel A, we plot the distribution of race by contributor status and partisanship. The differences for Republicans are not particularly notable, although the party is not particularly diverse relative to the Democrats. For Democrats, by contrast, we see some evidence that contributors are less diverse than the coalition as a whole, with contributors 10 percent black and 2 percent Hispanic compared to 21 and 9 percent of non-contributors. In Panel B, we see evidence that Democratic contributors are more secular than non-contributors, with 26 percent of contributors saying that religion is very important to their lives compared to 35 percent of non-contributors. Republican contributors do not appear to differ much from non-contributors about the importance of religion.[3] In summary, the demographic evidence shows that donors are notably different from non-donors on demographics. We turn next to examining behavioral differences.

[3] We again benchmark these differences against a comparison of validated 2012 voters to non-voters. As with income, education, and age, the differences for race and religion are notably less stark between voters and non-voters than between donors and non-donors. See Figure S7.

Contributors Vote More than Non-Contributors

Apart from simply giving money, do contributors vote more than non-contributors? Our data include validated records from state election administrators of prior general and primary election turnout for these registrants. Analyzing these data, we find that contributors are much more likely than non-contributors to participate in primary elections. They are also somewhat more likely to vote in general elections. These differences persist even when we account for common factors like wealth and education that likely affect both voting and contribution behavior.

In Figure S5, we plot rates of validated political behaviors for donors and non-donors by respondent party identification. How much more do donors participate than non-donors? Panel A presents rates of turnout in the 2012 general election for these four groups. Democratic and Republican donors turned out at 93 and 94 percent, respectively, while the rates for the corresponding non-donor registered voters are 74 and 82 percent. In Panel B, we present rates of turnout in the 2012 congressional primary for these groups, finding that Democratic and Republican donors turned out at rates of 56 and 70 percent, respectively, compared to 23 and 39 percent for non-donors. Donors are therefore about 10 to 20 points more likely to vote in general elections than non-donors, and about 30 points more likely to vote in primary elections (these differences are even larger in proportional terms).

One concern with this analysis is that contributors are, as is shown above, wealthier and more educated than non-contributors, differences that may explain their higher rates of both contribution and participation. To assess this possibility, we model turnout with an indicator for the respondent being a contributor along with controls for family income, race, education, and age in decades. Table S1 presents coefficients from these regression models, modeled separately for Democrats and Republicans. To summarize those findings, we continue to find that being a contributor is a significant predictor of voting. Republican contributors are estimated to be more likely than non-contributors to vote in the 2012 general and 2012 congressional primary by 6 and 20 percentage points ($p < .01$), respectively. Democratic contributors are 9 and 21 percentage points ($p < .01$) more likely to participate in those same elections. These predicted effects are as large as, or larger than, the effects of having a high school degree rather than not having completed high school.

Comparison: Differences between Voters and Non-Voters

In Figure S6, we compare differences between voters and non-voters on income, education, and age as a point of comparison to Figure S3. It is clear that the differences between voters and non-voters are much smaller than those between donors and non-donors. For example, while Democratic identifiers making more than $100,000 make up 37 percent of contributors but only 13 percent of non-contributors, a compositional difference of almost 25 points, the comparable figures by turnout are 16 percent (voters) and 10 percent (non-voters), a difference of only 6 points. Differences on education and age are also more muted by participation. This comparison suggests that making campaign donations is a more differentiating behavior than voting in presidential elections.

In Figure S7, we compare differences between voters and non-voters on race and religion as a point of comparison to Figure S4. As with income, education, and age, the differences for race and religion are notably less stark between voters and non-voters than between donors and non-donors.

In Figure S8, we present the rate of registration with either the Democratic or Republican parties for respondents from the 31 states plus the District of Columbia which have validated party of registration. (Other states do not register voters with a political party.) This is the proportion of the matched registrants who are registered either Democrat or Republican as opposed to with a third party or with no party. We find increased rates of registration with a party for these registrants, who on the survey equally identified themselves with the party by survey response, of 51.0 and 66.1 percent for donors and 42.1 and 54.7 percent for non-donors.

Effect of Measurement Error on Comparisons to CFscores

One concern with our conclusion that CFscores and other measures derived from contributions by individuals to candidates are weakly correlated with ideology in each party is measurement error. To preserve anonymity, YouGov added random noise to the CFscore for each of the matched donors. In this section we use three procedures to see if this measurement error may be attenuating the relationship, in each case finding little evidence that it is.

As a first step, we ran a bootstrap simulation where on each draw we randomly perturbed the CFscore by the same amount of random noise that YouGov added to the original score (a random draw from a uniform distribution from -0.1 to 0.1). We then looked at the maximum correlation we observed across these bootstrap samples to observe the "best case" scenario for the random noise having attenuated the correlation. Across these 1000 bootstrap samples, we find maximal correlations of $r = 0.12$ for Democrats, $r = 0.50$ for Republicans, and $r = 0.15$ for Republicans with CFscores less than 0, the final category excluding a smattering of Republicans who had Democrat-like scores.

A second way to evaluate the effect of the measurement error is by using two measures of the CFscore. This takes advantage of our having had YouGov merge each donor to two different CFscores. We created our own 2012 CFscore by creating a dollar-weighted average of the recipient CFscores from the 2012 DIME data, and YouGov also delivered us the original Dynamic CFscore measured across all years from the DIME data. Both values had the random noise added from the same distribution, and so we compare policy ideology additionally to the original Dynamic CFscore and to the average of the original and 2012 dollar-weighted CFscores. Because the random noise added to each variable is independent with a mean of 0, the average of the two CFscore measures should have less measurement error than the individual components. If measurement error was driving our result, we would expect the resulting correlation between the policy ideology and the averaged CFscores to be stronger. We present these plots in Figure S9, which shows again a mostly flat relationship within-party between policy ideology and these alternative versions of the CFscore. Correlations with these two measures are also consistent with the CFscore we use in the main text, with $r = .17$ and .10

between policy ideology and original CFscore for Republicans and Democrats with scores greater than and less than 0, and r = .16 and .10 with the average CFscore.

A third way to evaluate potential measurement error is to consider that our policy ideology scale may not be accurately picking up the salient dimension of ideology that drive individual donations. Thus, in Figure S10, we compare respondent self-reported ideology (1=very conservative, 2=conservative, 3=moderate or don't know, 4=liberal, 5=very liberal) to the average of the 2012 and original CFscore. We find that the relationship between self-reported ideology and CFscore is mostly flat for scores less than -1 or greater than .75, similar to our findings in Figure 2 of the main text.

Finally, in Figure S12, we reproduce the results of Figure 2 in the main text by separately partitioning the sample by the number of 2012 contributions made by the individual. It may be that measurement error for contributors making a few donations attenuates the scores, but that as the number of contributions increases, the CFscore more closely resembles the policy ideology of the individual. While these subsamples are somewhat small, the three frames in Figure S12 do not show any increase in the relationship between CFscore and policy ideology as the number of contributions increases. As before, the CFscore differentiates Democrats from Republicans, but does not appear to differentiate the policy ideology within each party coalition.

Figure S1



Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure S2



Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure S3: Demographic Comparisons of Contributors and Non-Contributors, by Party







Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure S4: Race and Religion of Contributors and Non-Contributors, by Party





Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure S5: Participation by Contributors and Non-Contributors, by Party





Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure S6: Demographic Comparisons of Voters and Non-Voters, by Party







Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure S7: Race and Religion of Voters and Non-Voters, by Party





Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure S8



Source: 2012 CCES merged to DIME data; Only states with Party of Registration

Figure S9





Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure S10



Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure S11: Foreign Policy Ideology of Contributors and Non-Contributors, by Party



Source: Merged CCES/DIME dataset.

Figure S12: Relationship between Policy Ideology and Estimated CFscore by Party and Number 2012 contributions







Note: Partisans include leaners. See text for details. Source: Merged CCES/DIME.

Table S1: Predicting Participation by Donor Status, Multivariate Regression

	(1) Turnout 2012 General, Republicans	(2) Turnout 2012 Primary, Republicans	(3) Turnout 2012 General, Democrats	(4) Turnout 2012 Primary, Democrats
Is a contributor (matched to CCES case, 1=yes)	0.056	0.195	0.089	0.210
	[0.014]***	[0.017]***	[0.010]***	[0.011]***
Family Income: $10,000 - $19,999	0.040	-0.073	-0.016	0.021
	[0.020]**	[0.025]***	[0.015]	[0.015]
Family Income: $20,000 - $29,999	0.113	-0.027	0.001	0.019
	[0.019]***	[0.024]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Family Income: $30,000 - $39,999	0.102	-0.039	-0.009	0.007
	[0.019]***	[0.023]*	[0.014]	[0.014]
Family Income: $40,000 - $49,999	0.112	-0.035	0.025	0.026
	[0.019]***	[0.023]	[0.015]*	[0.015]*
Family Income: $50,000 - $59,999	0.132	-0.024	0.042	0.055
	[0.019]***	[0.023]	[0.015]***	[0.015]***
Family Income: $60,000 - $69,999	0.166	0.016	0.048	0.017
	[0.020]***	[0.025]	[0.017]***	[0.017]
Family Income: $70,000 - $79,999	0.156	-0.003	0.006	0.061
	[0.019]***	[0.024]	[0.016]	[0.016]***
Family Income: $80,000 - $99,999	0.155	0.023	0.078	0.046
	[0.019]***	[0.024]	[0.016]***	[0.016]***
Family Income: $100,000 - $119,999	0.195	-0.007	0.084	0.030
	[0.020]***	[0.025]	[0.018]***	[0.018]*
Family Income: $120,000 - $149,999	0.143	-0.045	0.061	0.050
	[0.021]***	[0.027]*	[0.019]***	[0.019]***
Family Income: $150,000 - $199,999	0.178	-0.003	0.043	0.043
	[0.024]***	[0.031]	[0.022]*	[0.022]*
Family Income: $200,000 - $249,999	0.219	0.058	-0.031	0.004
	[0.034]***	[0.043]	[0.031]	[0.031]
Family Income: $250,000 or more	0.126	-0.029	0.012	0.024
	[0.029]***	[0.037]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Family Income: DK/Refused	0.161	0.054	0.079	0.074
	[0.018]***	[0.023]**	[0.015]***	[0.016]***
Race: Black	-0.089	-0.057	0.030	-0.014
	[0.025]***	[0.032]*	[0.007]***	[0.007]*
Race: Hispanic	-0.118	-0.091	-0.093	-0.002
	[0.014]***	[0.017]***	[0.011]***	[0.011]
Race: Asian	-0.159	-0.173	-0.195	-0.051
	[0.025]***	[0.031]***	[0.021]***	[0.021]**
Race: Native American	0.016	-0.023	-0.041	0.002
	[0.030]	[0.038]	[0.039]	[0.039]
Race: Mixed	0.042	0.034	-0.014	0.026
	[0.027]	[0.033]	[0.019]	[0.019]
Race: Other	0.039	0.097	0.079	0.011
	[0.022]*	[0.028]***	[0.028]***	[0.028]
Race: Middle Eastern	-0.066	-0.171	-0.330	-0.069
	[0.074]	[0.093]*	[0.093]***	[0.093]
Education: High school graduate	0.074	0.136	0.056	0.034
	[0.012]***	[0.015]***	[0.011]***	[0.011]***
Education: Some college	0.123	0.196	0.117	0.083
	[0.012]***	[0.016]***	[0.011]***	[0.011]***
Education: 2-year	0.107	0.200	0.133	0.083
	[0.014]***	[0.018]***	[0.014]***	[0.014]***
Education: 4-year	0.142	0.227	0.166	0.134
	[0.013]***	[0.016]***	[0.012]***	[0.012]***
Education: Post-grad	0.132	0.235	0.164	0.166
	[0.015]***	[0.019]***	[0.014]***	[0.014]***
Age in decades: 2	-0.057	-0.068	-0.007	-0.030
	[0.018]***	[0.023]***	[0.019]	[0.020]
Age in decades: 3	-0.028	-0.023	0.022	0.011
	[0.018]	[0.023]	[0.020]	[0.020]
Age in decades: 4	-0.016	0.060	0.038	0.054
	[0.018]	[0.022]***	[0.020]*	[0.020]***
Age in decades: 5	0.018	0.120	0.070	0.113
	[0.017]	[0.022]***	[0.019]***	[0.019]***
Age in decades: 6	0.047	0.220	0.126	0.196
	[0.017]***	[0.021]***	[0.019]***	[0.020]***
Age in decades: 7	0.079	0.289	0.181	0.263
	[0.018]***	[0.023]***	[0.021]***	[0.021]***
Age in decades: 8	0.132	0.393	0.176	0.373
	[0.030]***	[0.037]***	[0.036]***	[0.037]***
Age in decades: 9	0.109	0.186	0.094	0.473
	[0.134]	[0.168]	[0.148]	[0.148]***
Constant	0.584	0.123	0.564	0.048
	[0.024]***	[0.030]***	[0.023]***	[0.023]**
Observations	17833	17833	21461	21461
R-squared	0.050	0.100	0.070	0.110
Mean of DV	0.860	0.480	0.800	0.330
SD of DV	0.350	0.500	0.400	0.470

Standard errors in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table S2: Factor Analysis Construction of Ideology Scale

Variable	Summary Statistics (Means and standard deviations)	Factor Coefficient
Gun Control = Less Strict	0.141	0.047
	(0.348)	
Gun Control = Kept As They Are	0.388	0.038
	(0.487)	
Gun Control = Missing	0.002	-0.001
	(0.039)	
Climate = There is enough evidence that climate change is taking place and some	0.300	-0.033
	(0.458)	
Climate = We don't know enough about global climate change, and more research is	0.210	0.025
	(0.407)	
Climate = Concern about global climate change is exaggerated. No action is nece	0.159	0.067
	(0.366)	
Climate = Global climate change is not occurring; this is not a real issue.	0.056	0.032
	(0.231)	
Climate = Missing	0.003	-0.001
	(0.055)	
Abortion = The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when t	0.259	0.054
	(0.438)	
Abortion = The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, o	0.132	0.008
	(0.338)	
Abortion = By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matt	0.497	-0.080
	(0.500)	
Abortion = Missing	0.008	0.003
	(0.087)	
Jobs-Environment = Environment somewhat more important	0.176	-0.037
	(0.381)	
Jobs-Environment = About the same	0.316	-0.014
	(0.465)	
Jobs-Environment = Economy somewhat more important	0.245	0.037
	(0.430)	
Jobs-Environment = Much more important to protect jobs, even if environment wors	0.139	0.046
	(0.346)	
Jobs-Environment = Missing	0.004	-0.001
	(0.066)	
Gay Marriage = Oppose	0.474	0.112
	(0.499)	
Gay Marriage = Missing	0.011	0.000
	(0.104)	
Affirmative Action = Somewhat support	0.253	-0.064
	(0.435)	
Affirmative Action = Somewhat oppose	0.260	-0.003
	(0.439)	
Affirmative Action = Strongly oppose	0.346	0.118
	(0.476)	
Affirmative Action = Missing	0.004	-0.002
	(0.066)	
Balanced Budget Pref 1 = Cut Domestic Spending	0.383	0.138
	(0.486)	
Balanced Budget Pref 1 = Raise Taxes	0.203	-0.044
	(0.402)	
Balanced Budget Pref 1 = Missing	0.015	0.005
	(0.120)	
Fiscal Preference -- #2 = Cut Domestic Spending	0.351	-0.110
	(0.477)	
Fiscal Preference -- #2 = Raise Taxes	0.438	0.046
	(0.496)	
Fiscal Preference -- #2 = Missing	0.019	0.005
	(0.137)	
Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes = No	0.536	0.112
	(0.499)	
Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border. = No	0.435	-0.098
	(0.496)	
Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally. = No	0.600	-0.135
	(0.490)	
Fine US businesses that hire illegal immigrants. = No	0.370	-0.061
	(0.483)	
Prohibit illegal immigrants from using emergency hospital care and public school = No	0.681	-0.085
	(0.466)	
Deny automatic citizenship to American-born children of illegal immigrants. = No	0.632	-0.118
	(0.482)	
Observations	54535	

Standard deviations in parentheses

Table S3: Predicting Policy Ideology Using Contributor Status, Multivariate Regression, High Education High Interest only

	(2)	(3)	(5)	(6)
	Ideological scale from policy items (-1=Lib, 1=Cons)			
	Republicans	Republicans	Democrats	Democrats
Is a contributor (matched to CCES case, 1=yes)	0.085	0.066	-0.122	-0.106
	[0.015]***	[0.015]***	[0.009]***	[0.009]***
Validated 2012 General Vote (1=yes, 0=no, .=unknown)	0.070	0.066	-0.070	-0.057
	[0.017]***	[0.016]***	[0.011]***	[0.011]***
Validated 2012 Cong. Primary Vote (1=yes, 0=no, .=unknown)	0.074	0.050	-0.017	-0.016
	[0.010]***	[0.010]***	[0.008]**	[0.008]**
Constant	0.352	0.365	-0.514	-0.314
	[0.015]***	[0.112]***	[0.010]***	[0.044]***
Observations	4966	4966	5874	5874
Demographic indicators? [detailed in Note below]	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.030	0.100	0.050	0.130
Mean of DV	0.510	0.510	-0.620	-0.620
SD of DV	0.340	0.340	0.280	0.280

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets

Note: Dependent variable is policy ideology scale, which ranges from -1 (Liberal) to 1 (Conservative).

Indicators for contribution status and participation are not mutually exclusive.

Indicators for each category of income, education, gender, household union membership, race, age in decades, and importance of religion suppressed.